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INTRODUCTION 
While all law is highly indeterminate, the difficulties of the law 
governing federal administrative procedure have proved especially great. 1 
1. One concise statement to this effect appears in Anton in Scalia, Judicial Deference 
to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 ("Administrative law is not 
for sissies .... "). For a clearer, but lengthier recent statement, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Comment, Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. Ill 0 
(1995) (characterizing aptly the conclusions of Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, 
Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of AdministrativeDecisions, 44 
DUKE L.J. 1051 (1995)): 
Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy['s] ... study of the history of judicial review of 
agency action supports their conclusion that many of the legal doctrines applicable 
to that process are indeterminate to an unusual degree-a court often can write an 
opinion that reverses a major agency action as easily as it can write an opinion that· 
upholds the same action. We do not see, and would not long tolerate, this degree 
of indeterminacy with respect to the basic doctrines that govern other fields oflaw .. 
Imagine, for instance, a world in which the concepts of"offer" and "acceptance" 
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To old hands, as well as new students, its materials present a shadowy 
picture, which is the result of ambiguities that blur even its most basic 
distinctions. 2 
The persistence of ambiguities as to fundamental iss~es may seem 
remarkable in light ofthe attempt at clarification made fifty years ago with 
the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).3 However, the 
ambiguities persist because they are built upon deep-seated and contradicto-
ry, impulses which are resistant to any sort of large-scale resolution. 
At th~ center of these opposing impulses are, on the one hand, the desire 
for broad· agency discretion and, on the other, a yearning for vigorous 
judicial review of agency action in order to preserve the "rule of law" as 
traditionally understood.4 This opposition has led to conflicted and vague 
doctrinal formulations of the scope of judicial review of agency action. 
Section 706 of the APA, which specifies standards of review for a 
variety of agency determinations, is a disorderly mess of 'ambiguous and 
overlapping standards.5 Examples of the confusion that resulted after the 
enactment of the APA can be seen in the various judicial interpretations of 
section 706's standards. These include the ambiguous rules set out in 
are so malleable that parties who attempt to enter into a contract can do no better 
than to predict that there is a 50% probability that a court eventually will hold that 
their conduct created an enforceable contractual relationship. If such a legal 
environment seems both unimaginable and intolerable, you are in a position to 
empathize with a federal agency that must attempt to issue a major rule that is 
subject to judicial review through application of the judicfal review provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Ifthe agency does everything it believes 
that it must do to issue such a rule, the probability that the rule will be upheld is 
less than 50%. 
See also Thomas M. Susman, Now More than Ever: Reauthorizing the AdministrativeCon-
forence, Reforming Regulation, and Reinventing Government, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 677, 
682 (1994) ("Administrative procedure is ... often mundane, occasionally obscure, but 
extremely complex."). 
2. See infra notes 4-3 I and accompanying text (describing lack of clarity inherent in 
administrative law). 
3. Act of June I I, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 55I-559, 70I-706 (I994)). 
4. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, HeightenedScrutinyofthe Fourth Branch: 
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, I 987 
DUKE L.J. 387, 389 (concluding that liberal tradition, or traditional court-centered rule of 
law culture, is based on separation of powers and due process considerations and implies 
meaningful review of agency action, contr~ting this tradition with regime of practical 
necessity, expertise, and efficiency which requires deferential review). 
5. Pierce, supra note I, at II 13. 
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Chevron6 attempting to specify the deference that a reviewing court owes 
an agency's interpretation of its own enabling ace They also include the 
confusing standards, as described in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. 
v. Volpe, 8 governing judicial review of a wide variety of agency decisions 
concerning fact and policy.9 
Separate from the issue of which verbal standard of review is appropriate 
for which sort of agency determination is that of the intensity of review that 
each standard demands. Overton Park's well-known, schizophrenic (if not 
fully contradictory) statement of the appropriate intensity of arbitrary and 
capricious review makes the discretion/rule-of-law tensions clear: "Certain-
ly, the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity. But 
that presumption is not to shield his action from a thorough, probing, 
in-depth review."10 
The notion of discretion itself appears mysterious and contradictory in 
the APA. The statute exempts from review matters which are "committed 
to agency discretion,"\\ but provides that there shall be judicial review for 
abuse of agency discretion in a presumably large category of cases. 12 This 
apparent contradiction has received a great deal of attention from students 
of administrative law generating extended and heated debates. 13 The two 
6. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). 
7. !d. 
8. 401 u.s. 402 (1971). 
9. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,415-17 (1971) 
(attempting to explain how review to determine if agency has considered relevant factors 
relates to review for arbitrariness and capriciousness, and how latter relates to review for 
errors of law determination or factfinding). 
10. !d. at 415 (citation omitted). 
11. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1994). This section provides in part: "This chapter applies, 
according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial 
review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." !d. 
!d. 
12. !d. § 706. Section 706 defines the scope of review as follows: 
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. The reviewing court shall-(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld 
or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; .... 
13. Raoul Berger maintained that all abuse of discretion is correctable by courts at the 
instance of those with standing under traditional criteria, while Kenneth Culp Davis main-
tained the existence of a small, but significant, class of exercises of discretion by agencies 
reviewable only in the political branches. For their exchange-amounting to four attacks and 
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proviSions manage peaceful coexistence only because "discretion" in 
"committed to agency discretion" has been accorded a meaning different 
from that of the same word in "abuse of discretion."14 Even then, the 
Court's development of the notion of agency discretion in each of the two 
catagories has not been particularly satisfactory. 15 
Nearly as fundamental as the doctrinal ambiguity generated by the 
discretion/rule-of-law opposition, is the lack of a clear line separating the 
categories of adjudication and rulemaking. These categories blur as they 
are used within each of the somewhat separate schemes of the Constitution 
and the APA. The constitutional distinction between adjudicative and 
legislative-style proceedings is fuzzy, although clear at its core. 16 The 
four responses over roughly two years, spilling out of the pages of one journal to another, 
and then to a third-see Raoul Berger, AdministrativeArbitrarinessand Judicial Review, 65 
COLUM. L. REv. 55 (1965);4KENNETII C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 28.16 
(Supp. 1965); Raoul Berger, AdministrativeArbitrariness: A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 
U. PA. L. REv. 783 (1966); Kenneth C. Davis,AdministrativeArbitrariness-A Final Word, 
114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966); Raoul Berger, AdministrativeArbitrariness-ARejoinder 
to Professor Davis' 'Final Word', 114 U. PA. L. REV. 816 (1966); Kenneth C. Davis, 
AdministrativeArbitrariness-APostscript, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 823 (1966); Raoul Burger, 
AdministrativeArbitrariness,A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1967); Kenneth C. Davis, 
AdministrativeArbitrariness/s Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1967). 
For a discussion of other scholarly views, see Ronald M. Levin, Understanding 
Unreviewability in AdministrativeLaw, 74 MINN. L. REv. 689, 694-702 & nn.S0-53 ( 1990). 
14. The Supreme Court has distinguished reviewable discretion from that which is in 
the APA 's technical sense"Committed to Agency Discretion" by concluding that the special 
hallmark of the latter is that there is no law to apply. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410; 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-35 (1985); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 
(1988). 
15. See Levin, supra note 13, at 702-34 (criticizing the current Supreme Court 
definition of the "Committed to Agency Discretion" category). For a more nuanced and 
convincing vision of the content of unreviewable action under the "Committed to Agency 
Discretion" category, see pages 734-81 of Levin's article. See also Harvey Saferstein, 
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of Committed to Agency Discretion, 82 HARV. L. 
REv. 367 (1968). 
16. In United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 245-46 (1973), the 
Court explained: 
While the line dividing [legislation and adjudication] may not always be a 
bright one [Supreme Court decisions dealing with the requirements of due process] 
represent a recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for 
the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and 
proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other. 
* * * 
... [In this rate making proceeding the Commission' sorder was] applicable across 
the board to all of the common carriers .... No effort was made to single out any 
particular [one] for special consideration based on its own peculiar circumstances. 
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APA's differentiation appears in definitions which do not clearly distinguish 
those two categories even though they are intended to have separate fields 
of application and distinct procedural consequences. 17 The APA's 
differentiation between adjudicative and legislative action has proved 
intelligible only by means of reading common sense and constitutional 
tradition into the statute. 18 
!d. at 245-46. 
17. Section 551(4) of the APA states in pertinent part: 
'[R]u1e' means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law 
or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an 
agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, 
corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, 
appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, 
or practices bearing on any of the foregoing. 
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994) (emphasis added). Section 551(6) reads, irr full, as follows: 
"'order' means the whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, 
injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but 
including licensing .... " !d. 
Everything that happens in the world of which applicability can be predicated is either 
of"general or particular applicability" or some combination of the two. As far as we know 
everything that happens in the universe has only '·future effect." Taken literally,§ 551(4) 
results in every administrative decision producing a rule. 
For example, an SEC enforcement action against a particular participant in securities 
transactions is of particular applicability and future effect. This is most obviously true if 
the agency issues a coercive order requiring the defendant to refrain from certain practices 
in the future, but it is also true if the agency orders reparations. The effect of the order is 
in the future gauged from the time of its issuance. Despite this, any respectable 
administrative procedure expert could identify such a proceeding as an adjudication, because 
the language of section 551(4) is not taken seriously in this respect. Instead, it is infused 
with meaning from common law and constitutional law sources. 
18. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872,875-76 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978): 
The determination that the EPA must make under§ 316 of the FWPCA is not a 
rule because it is not "designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or 
policy." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). Rather the EPA must decide a specific factual 
question already prescribed by statute. Since the determination is not a rule, it is 
an order. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6). The agency process for formulating an order is an 
adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7). Therefore, § 554 rather than§ 553 of the APA 
is the relevant section. The same result is dictated because § 316(a) of the 
FWPCA is a licensing, 5 U.S.C. § 551(9), since it results in the granting or denial 
of a form of permission. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(8). A license is an order. 5 U.S.C. 
§ 551(6). 
!d. The first sentence of the above-quoted passage is misleading. The determination, which 
is admittedly an adjudication, certainly can be brought to implement, interpret, or prescribe 
law or policy, for example, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and NLRB v. 
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The APA's distinction between formal and informal proceedings 
(whether rulemaking or adjudication) is drawn in a reasonably clear way in 
terms of the procedural attributes of each variety of proceeding. 19 The 
statute is not at all clear, however, as to how to determine which real world 
proceedings are entitled to which sort of procedural treatment. 20 To 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), but only as long as the agency is willing to use 
the new rule to dispose of the specific case before it, for example, see NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
The language of§ 551(4) (as opposed to the general notions of adjudication and 
legislation normally read into that section) seems to have its greatest impact in presumptively 
precluding prospective agency adjudication, or use of an adjudication as a vehicle for 
announcement of a new rule which the court does not apply to the matter at hand but 
reserves for future cases. Some have seen the announcement of prospective rules in 
adjudication as opposed to the notion that only rulemaking is "offuture effect." Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 217 (1988) (Scalia J., concurring). 
19. This is certainly true with. respect to formal proceedings, whether of the rulemaking 
or adjudication variety. Sections 556 and 557 of the APA specify the procedures in detail. 
As to informal proceedings, section 553 spells out, with reasonable clarity, the limited 
procedures available to interested parties. Some of these are subject, however, to a range 
of interpretation. For example, the requirement. that parties be permitted to participate by 
comment has been read to make comment the equivalent of a very limited paper cross-
examination as to the most crucial basis on which the agency relies in issuing a rule. 
20. The APA's provisions for rulemaking and adjudication state that proceedings are 
formal if the agency's organic act "require[s] [them] to be made on the record after 
opportunity for agency hearing .... " 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a), 554(c)(2) (1994). This 
might naturally seem to require a search, not simply for specific language in an agency's 
enabling act, but for. the "meaning" of the words in the act that require a hearing. The 
question asked for each agency proceeding would be whether Congress intended sufficient 
formality to trigger any additional procedures in§§ 556 and 557. Obviously, such an inquiry 
yields as much uncertainty as any interpretive enterprise. · 
Whether correct or not, the Supreme Court has imposed clarity on the APA as it 
pertains to rulemaking. In Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 237-38, the Court either 
reduced, or very nearly reduced, the triggers of§§ 556 and 557 procedures to the presence 
of the words "on the record" or their synonyms. Rarely, if ever, will the structure of the 
statute, the importance of its subject, the circumstances surrounding its enactment or other 
aspects of its legislative history trigger formal procedures in the absence of such words. 
The Florida East Coast decision has not completely removed the original ambiguity 
of the statute. Some lower federal courts treat it as inapplicable to administrative 
adjudications, thus allowing a more .wide-range consideration of factors to determine 
formality. For example, the First Circuit, in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, 512 F.2d at 
876, found that: 
At the outset we reject the position of intervenor PSCO that the precise words ·'on 
the record" must be used to trigger the APA. The Supreme Court has clearly 
rejected such an extreme reading even in the context of rule making under § 553 
of the APA. Rather, we think that the resolution of this issue turns on the 
substantive nature of the hearing Congress intended to provide. 
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compound the difficulties, at least for those new to administrative law, at 
times, courts and commentators use the word "legislative" to indicate that 
a proceeding is informal/1 while more ordinarily it is used to mean a 
process which makes general rules. 22 This strange first usage is highlight-
ed by one of many passages in the Supreme Court's Overton Park opinion: 
"The Secretary's decision to allow the expenditure of federal funds to build 
1-40 through Overton Park was plainly not an exercise of a rulemaking 
function. . .. The hearing [was] nonadjudicatory, quasi-legislative in 
nature. . . :m 
Perhaps the most interesting of recent judicial difficulties and scholarly 
debate stems from the current, nearly contradictory, view of the APA 
provisions for informal rulemaking.24 These provisions require agencies 
which promulgate legislative rules to follow informal, but still somewhat 
onerous, notice and comment procedures. Exempted from such require-
ments, however, are two varieties of "publication rules": policy statements 
and interpretative rules?5 
!d. (citations omitted). 
21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (explaining Overton Park's use of"quasi-
legislative" to describe informal adjudication). 
·22. For recognition that this is the usual legal usage, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
899 (6th ed. 1990). For examples of this usage in administrative law cases, see United 
States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571-72 
(1973) (reasoning that "Congress intended to deprive the Civil Service Commission of 
rulemaking power in the sense of exercising a subordinate legislative role in fashioning a 
more expansive definition of the kind of conduct that would violate the prohibition against 
taking an active part in political management or political campaigns."); RLC Indus. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 58 F.3d 413, 413-17 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Rulemaking, the quasi-legislative 
power, is intended to add substance to the Acts of Congress, to complete absent but 
necessary details .... Adjudication, the quasi-judicial power, is intended to provide for the 
enforcement of agency ... regulations on a case-by-case basis .. , (quoting 3 STEIN ET AL., 
ADMINISlRATIVE LAW § 14.01, at 14-2 (1994))). 
23. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-15 (1971) 
(emphasis added). 
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (explaining informal rulemaking procedure). 
25. Section 553(b) ofthe APA states that, "Except when notice or hearing is required 
by statute, this subsection does not apply-( A) to interpretative rules, general statements of 
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; ... :· 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) 
(1994). See PETER L. SlRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISlRATIVE JUSTICE IN TilE 
UNITED STATES 157 (1989) (applying term "publication rules" to interpretative rules and 
policy statements); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1463, 1467 (1992) (describing "publication rulemaking" and its processes). 
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Courts have never clearly distinguished the two sorts of publication rules 
from each other. 26 At one time, the distinction between these two 
categories, on the one hand, and legislative rules, on the other, seemed 
relatively firmly grounded in two features of the former: Publication rules 
were said to be tentative views of the agency, required to be reconsidered 
each time the agency applied them to particular circumstances, and were 
also subject to more intensive scrutiny on judicial review. 27 
Given the real possibility of Chevron deference for publication rules as 
well as legislative rules, 28 the distinction between legislative and publica-
tion rules becomes tenuous in many,29 though not all,30 cases because 
26. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818F.2d 943, 946(D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating 
that "[t]he distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules or policy statements 
has been described at various times as 'tenuous"' but also drawing no distinction between 
latter two categories). 
27. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm 'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
28. See Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2026-27 (1995) (suggesting at least some 
deference under Chevron for an interpretive rule); Health Ins. Ass'n of America v. Shalala, 
23 F.3d 412,424 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995) ("We have often 
applied Chevron deference to interpretive rules without comment .... Because the parties 
have agreed that Chevron deference is appropriate h~re, we have no need to address the 
scope of deference to an interpretive rule."); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. 
Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1995) (according complete Chevron deference to 
interpretation of statute contained in letter from high agency official). But see id. at 185, 
188 (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (mustering impressive case law support against Chevron 
deference for non legislative rules); accord, e.g. Robert A. Anthony, Which Interpretations 
Should Bind the Courts, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 55-58 (1990) [hereinafter Anthony, Bind the 
Courts]; KENNETII C. DAVIS & RICHARDS. PIERCE, JR., ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 6.3, at 235-36 (3d ed. 1994). This matter is truly unresolved. The Supreme Court 
in Reno seemed to hedge on full Chevron deference. 115 S. Ct. at 2026-27. Still earlier 
Supreme Court cases gave Chevron deference to interpretations in an opinion letter and an 
amicus brief. See, e.g., Mead v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1989). 
29. See CommunityNutritionlnst., 818 F.2d at 945-46, in which the court agreed with 
characterizations of the distinction between policy statements (and probably interpretative 
rules) and legislative rules as"tenuous," "blurred," "enshrouded in considerable smog," and 
"baffling;"' but attempted, unsuccessfully, to clarify this by describing legislative rules as 
binding norms. See American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 
1106, 1108-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (demonstrating that court in Community Nutrition Inst. left 
law nearly as fuzzy as it was found). 
30. Some rules are clearly legislative. As the court in American Mining stated: 
Accordingly, insofar as our cases can be reconciled at all, we think it almost 
exclusively on the basis of whether the purported interpretive rule has "legal 
effect", which in turn is best ascertained by asking (1) whether in the absence of 
the rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or 
other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2) 
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presumably the differential judicial scrutiny has disappeared or greatly 
narrowed.31 The notion that a reviewing court can effectively require an 
agency to view its own publication rules as especially tentative seems 
unlikely from a psychological viewpoint. Given the agency's investment 
in its decisions, an adopted policy is likely to possess a great deal of inertia, 
making it resistant- although not immune-to real reconsideration.32 
From a _legal viewpoint, as long as the agency provides a formal opportuni-
ty for reconsideration, it seems difficult for courts to enforce the require-
ment of actual redeliberation. 
It is for these reasons that efforts to draw clearer distinctions between 
legislative rulemaking and publication rules have floundered-leading to the 
brink of contradiction. At present, one could argue that as a result of 
forces described above, many rules which are legislative in effect both are, 
and are not, required to be promulgated in accordance with the APA's 
rulemaking procedures.33 
whether the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, (3) 
whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, or (4) 
whether the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule. If the answer to any 
of these questions is affirmative, we have a legislative, not an interpretive rule. 
American Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1112. 
31. It is possible, however, that even if Chevron is applicable to policy statements, the 
latter would be scrutinized more than legislative rules. Scrutiny under Chevron's second 
prong reasonableness test could be seen as variable, requiring a stronger agency showing to 
justify a policy than to defend a comparable legislative rule. /d. at 1111-12. 
32. Even if formally subject to reconsideration, policy statements clearly have 
formidable inertia. See Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass'n v. Economic 
Regulatory Admin., 847 F.2d 1168, 1175 (5th Cir. 1988) (requiring agency to consider 
arguments against application of policy statement, but recognizing that statement could be 
relied on to shift burden of proof as to entitlement to exemption). 
33. Additionally, consider the notion that an agency pays the price of submission to 
strong scrutiny once-either up-front, by means of public participation in legislative 
rulemaking, or at the back end of judicial review, by means of greater court scrutiny of 
interpretative rules or policy statements. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992). If neither the up-front notice and comment scrutiny, nor the 
rear-end intense judicial review scrutiny is exacted, the distinction between publication rules 
and legislative rules will be seriously imperiled. But see American Mining Congress, 995 
F.2d at 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Williams, J.) (contending that Chevron's step two can be 
adjusted to provide stricter scrutiny for publication rules). 
All of this leads to hard questions about whether the coverage of informal, but 
relatively intense, rulemaking procedures are determined by the agency's choice of a label 
or by the more limiting, but still often nearly metaphysical, degrees of "binding" effect of 
the particular pronouncement. Again, contradictory policy preferences are responsible for 
this ambiguity. On the one hand, courts want to give effect to the APA's clear requirement 
that rules with legislative force must be made by means of relatively stringent ~;~gency 
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It may seem surprising that, fifty years after Congress enacted the APA, 
so many fundamental ambiguities remain. On reflection, however, there 
should be no surprise, given the continuing claims that strong and opposing 
values still plausibly make in administrative law culture. As a result, large 
scale solutions are unlikely. Instead, the law of administrative procedure 
usually reaches compromises between these opposing values in a fine-
grained, tentative, and highly-contextualized way-often within the confines 
of a particular case or narrowly defined set of circumstances. There is 
almost a Goldilocks quality to the law governing administrative proce-
dure:34 some resolutions of contradictory impulses are adjudged too much 
of this, or of that, or sometimes just right, but rarely are these conclusions 
generalized into even relatively firm legal doctrines. 
This Article discusses one of the many problems of ambiguity and 
contradiction under the APA. After Overton Park/5 this problem typically 
has been described as one concerning the nature of the "record" on which 
a court will review informal agency action.36 On this fiftieth anniversary 
of the APA, the foundations of federal regulation are under attack.37 As 
a result, the set of decisions to which the APA applies may soon be greatly 
reduced and the statutory procedures for those which remain may be 
changed. Consequently, a discussion limited to one technical feature of the 
current law of administrative procedure may be equivalent, for a neo-New 
Dealer, to fiddling while Rome bums or, for a proponent of the "Contract 
with America," to fiddling while Rome is scaled back to more harmonious 
proportions. Still, it is a safe prediction that, when the dust settles on 
procedures, a requirement provided as a counterweight to the delegation oflegislative power 
to agencies and the resulting attenuation of political accountability. On the other hand, 
courts want to encourage agencies to clarify regulatory requirements at the earliest possible 
stage, even before they are ready to promulgate rules that they are fully prepared to have 
bind them. 
34. See Sieck v. Russo, 869 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1989). 
35. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
36. See id. at 420 ("[R]eview is to be based on the full administrative record that was 
before the Secretary at the time he made his decision."); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 
(1973) ("[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already 
in existence .... "). See also Stephen Stark & Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed 
Attempt to Limit the Record in Review of Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333 
( 1984) (contending that Overton Park requirement of review on administrative record has 
seriously eroded). See infra notes 155-248. 
37. For a description and assessment of many proposals for change, see. Cass R. 
Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit 
State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247 (1996). 
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whatever renovation there will be, what remains of the past will be 
substantial, including many of the familiar problems. 
Among these problems will be that of determining the appropriate 
agency procedures for a variety of agency actions which affect diverse 
interests in varying ways and the scope of judicial review of these 
procedures. The focus of this Article-a determination of the appropriate 
record for judicial review of informal agency action-is an important part 
of those issues. 
The portions of the Overton Park opinion which bear on this question 
brim with contradictions similar to the others discussed above: 
[The hearing in before the agency]. .. is not designed to produce a record that is 
to be the basis of agency action-the basic requirement for substantial-evidence 
• 38 revtew .... 
Although a regulation requiring formal findings was issued after the Secretary had 
approved the route, a remand to him is not necessary as there is an administrative 
record facilitatingfull and prompt review of the Secretary's action . .. 39 
It is necessary to remand this case to the District Court for plenary review of 
the Secretary's decision. That review is to be based on the full administrative 
record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision.~· 
Pressing the contradiction further, the Overton Park Court did not just 
permit a reviewing court to demand that an agency provide a reviewing 
court with such a record, it required the agency to do so.41 Beyond this, 
the Court required that judicial review of informal proceedings be confined 
to a scrutiny of that record-precisely the requirement that the APA 
explicitly imposes on judicial review of agency formal proceedings.42 
While judicial scrutiny must be confined to such a record and must be 
deferential, as the Overton Park passage, quoted above, makes clear, the 
same passage also requires "a thorough, probing, in-depth review."43 The 
ambiguity of this standard is not only generated by the contradictory claims 
of the notions of rule of law and administrative discretion, but it is 
sufficiently great to permit courts to decide many like cases in contradictory 
ways. 
38. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added). 
39. !d. at 403 (emphasis added). 
40. !d. at 420 (emphasis added). 
41. !d. 
42. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1994). 
43. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415. 
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Some matters are clear, however. Not only must a reviewing court 
understand the material it analyzes in the record, but according to the Court 
in Overton Park, a reviewing court must assure itself that the agency has 
given adequate consideration to the "relevant factors. "44 Will this mandate 
sometimes conflict with the "On the Record Rule," pressing a court to look 
at information which was not before the agency when it made the decision 
under review? Here, the contradiction seems epistimological. Can a record 
establish its own completeness? Based on a plausible definition of 
"relevant factors," how can a court determine what was not considered by 
an agency solely by looking to a record of what was? If it cannot do so, 
how can a court both follow the On the Record Rule and engage in relevant 
factors analysis? 
While the lower federal courts generally have followed the On the 
Record Rule and its notions of deference, economy and bounded rationality, 
the apparently contradictory requirements of performing meticulous review 
while wearing blinders occasionally have caused them to recognize 
exceptions to the rule going beyond those which Overton Park indicated 
were to be the exclusive ones.45 · One particularly influential opinion, 
Asarco, Inc. v. EPA,46 concluded that occasionally the On the Record 
Rule, as articulated in the Overton Park opinion, must give way to the 
other demands of that opinion, which require a reviewing court to 
determine whether an agency has considered the relevant factors: 
[I]t is both unrealistic and unwise to "straightjacket" the reviewing court with the 
administrative record. It will often be impossible, especially when highly technical 
matters are involved, for the court to determine whether the agency took into 
consideration all relevant factors unless it looks outside the record to determine 
what matters the agency should have considered but did not. The court cannot 
adequately discharge its duty to engage in a "substantial inquiry" if it is required 
to take the agency's word that it considered all relevant matters.47 
Allowing a court to take evidence to consider the existence of possible 
relevant factors not developed in the record and not so clearly relevant as 
44. !d. at 416. 
45. See infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text for examples of cases recognizing 
some exceptions to the On the Record Rule, in addition to those announced by the Supreme 
Court in Overton Park as exclusive exceptions. For claims of great erosion of the On the 
Record Rule, see Steven Stark & Sarah Wald, supra note 36. For arguments that the Stark 
and Wald claims were and have proved extravagant, see infra notes 171-246 and 
accompanying text. 
46. 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980) (allowing direct court of appeals review of 
EPA decision). 
47. !d. 
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to be judicially noticeable seems a violation of Overton Park's requirement 
that administrative action be sustained or struck down on the record of 
information actually before the agency at the time of its decision.48 This 
seems especially true when combined with Vermont Yankee's vision of 
informal proceedings as minimalist.49 Below, this Article offers a way of 
harmonizing the two Overton Park requirements-review on the record and 
review for agency consideration of relevant factors-which seems more 
plausible than that of the Asarr:o court. On this interpretation, the 
requirement of relevant factor review is seen in a narrower way that, except 
for matters subject to judicial notice, requires no excursion beyond the 
administrative record. This view better complies with the Supreme Court's 
current vision of informal proceedings. 5° In the Conclusion, however, this 
Article argues that the Court's current vision is in need of serious 
reconsideration by the legislature rather than by the Court itself. 
Some lower federal court opinions have recognized a second exception, 
permitting introduction of evidence to explain to the court the technical 
background against which to judge the rationality of agency action. In the 
words again of the Ninth Circuit, in Association of Pacific Fisheries v. 
EPA: 51 
To a limited extent, therefore, the post-decision studies can be deemed a 
clarification or an explanation of the original information before the Agency, and 
for this purpose it is proper for us to consider them .... We do not think it is 
appropriate, however for either party to use [that information] as a new 
rationalization either for sustaining or attacking the agency's decision .... [i)t is 
inappropriate to rely on the specific conclusions of those studies to show that the 
[agency's action was) not the product of reasoned decision making .... 52 
48. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419. 
49. See infra notes 223-31 and accompanying text. 
50. Id 
51. Association of Pacific Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980). In 
this case, the extra-record information not allowed to supplement the record was also post-
decision information. /d. 
52. Id at 811-12 (emphasis added). Judicial consideration of studies subsequentto an 
agency decision may be a double violation of Overton Park's requirements that a court 
should (1) focus on what was available to the agency at the time of its decision, and (2) 
focus only on what the agency actually considered, a subset of the first requirement. A case 
such as PacificFisheriespresents the clearest violation of the second requirement. This is 
for the obvious reason that what was developed after an agency decision obviously was not 
considered at the time of the decision. In some cases purporting to use relevant factors 
analysis, it is unclear whether the court is bringing in factors that were not included in the 
record sent by the agency to the reviewing court, but actually considered by the agency and 
made part of the record in the Overton Park sense. There is no such ambiguity with a post-
decision study because it was not part of the agency record in any sense. 
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On careful examination, the use for which the Ninth <:;;ircuit allows 
introduction of information not originally before the agency ~ntradicts the 
limits it attempts to place on the use of such information. : Background 
·information is apparently legally irrelevant if it is clear, a priori, that it 
cannot make a difference to the outcome of review. But, if such informa-
tion can make a difference in the determination of arbitrariness, this means 
· that it could tum a decision which would pass arbitrary and capricious 
review on the original record into one that does not pass on an augmented 
record, or, conversely, it could convert one which failed into one which 
passes. This ~eems a violation of the Overton Park's On the Record Rule. 
This exception, too, is discussed below. While somewhat strange, an 
exception for technical background information, when carefully limited, can 
be harmonized with Overton Park's requirements.53 This Article con-
cludes that such information can be introduced into evidence before a 
reviewing court and be permitted to make a difference in the result, but 
only if it exerts its influence over a court's decision invisibly, never 
appearing as an explicit part of the court's opinion. 54 
Claims for erosion of the On the Record Rule have extended well 
beyond the two summarized above, and are discussed at length below. 
Based partly on the occasional deviations discussed above, the only piece 
of general scholarly commentary concerning the On the Record Rule seems 
to have seriously exaggerated the extent to which that rule has been eroded 
by the lower federal courts, finding not just the two exceptions discussed 
above, but six others as well: · 
[A]n examination of the concept of review on the record in the courts surprisingly 
reveals that the doctrine no longer exists in any coherent form, although judges and 
analysts pretend that it is still viable. Faced with the difficulty of defining the 
record in specific cases, courts have developed so many unwritten exceptions to 
the doctrine of record review, that industrious advocates now can introduce any 
evidence they choose in cases reviewing informal administrative action.55 
This Article criticizes the general thrust of that commentary either as a 
description of the law when it was written, or as a predictor of what is now 
current practice. The On the Record Rule of Overton Park has not been 
riddled out of existence by exceptions created by the lower federal courts. 
Some of the exceptions urged in the commentary are not exceptions at all. 
Another seems limited to a specific statutory scheme. This Article 
53. See infra notes 247-54 and accompanying text. 
54. !d. 
55. Stark & Wald, supra note 36, at 335-36. 
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demonstrates that the rule has been largely safe not only from latter day 
erosion by lower courts, but that it also has been largely safe from the two 
rather limited exceptions recognized originally by the Supreme Court in 
Overton Park itself. When analyzed, these original exceptions seem to 
have an interesting, but minuscule potential set of applications. 
Finally, in its Conclusion, this Article offers a brief critique of the 
current regime of judicial review of informal administrative action, offering 
some suggestions for reform. 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION: REVIEW BASED ON 
A RECORD VERSUS DE NOVO REVIEW 
A. Overton Park: The Supreme Court's Conception of Judicial Review 
of Agency Action 
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.. Vo/pe,56 the Supreme 
Court endorsed one of a number of possible models of judicial review of 
informal administrative action, the most common and least procedurally 
onerous way an agency may take action under the APA.57 In many, but 
not all respects, that conception was a diluted version of the model of 
judicial review of formal administrative action, a relatively rare, procedural-
ly onerous method of agency decisionmaking. 58 That formal model, in 
turn, was based, largely but not entirely, on another: the system for 
appellate review of judicial trials. 59 
I. The Model of Review for Formal Administrative Action 
In takingformal action, an agency, like a trial court, may consider only 
evidence properly admitted in the proceeding before it and subject to 
56. 401 u.s. 402 (1971). 
57. Compare the rigorous civil trial-like requirements of the formal provisions of the 
APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1994), with the Jess onerous requirements for informal 
rulemaking and the nearly nonexistent procedural requirements for informal adjudication. 
/d. §§ 553, 555. See P~nsion Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990) (indi-
cating no APA requirement permitting notice of issues in informal adjudications or of right 
to participate therein). 
58. The APA mandates the procedures to follow for review of formal administrative 
action. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 (1994). These procedures, triggered by sections 553 and 554 
when the enabling statute requires the agency action to be made "on the record," allow a 
party to present oral or documentary evidence, including rebuttal evidence, as well as oral 
cross-examination. /d. § 556(d). 
59. See infra notes 60-65. 
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rebuttal by opposing parties, often by means of cross examination.60 In 
such formal proceedings, an agency.is obligated to explain its decision in 
a manner similar to the way that trial courts are required to explain the 
results of non-jury trials-by explicitly connecting the facts found with the 
applicable law.61 
Review of formal agency decisions by the courts in many ways 
resembles review of a trial court by an appellate court. In appellate review 
of a trial court's decision, the focus is on the law, the evidentiary record, 
and, to some extent, on the trial court's explanation or opinion. Evidence 
not considered by the trial court normally cannot be considered by an 
appellate court.62 If newly discovered evidence or post-trial events warrant 
a change in a result, it is not the appellate process which initially affects the 
change. The appellate focus is on the correctness of the trial court's result 
based on the facts before the court at the time it reached its decision and 
60. An agency must explain its formal decisions with a statement of findings of fact and 
law, which illustrates the basis for its decision. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1994); see also Pension 
Benefit Gauranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-55 (1990). 
61. After a non-jury trial, a federal district court must make specific findings of fact 
and of law to support its final decision. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 52( a); see Lora v. Board of 
Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 251 (2d Cir. 1980); 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2579 at 537-48 {2d ed. 1994). 
62. Supplementation of the record with information not originally before the lower 
court ordinarily will not be allowed at the appellate Iev,el. FED. R. APP. PRO. IO(e). See 
9 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 210.08 at 10-46, 58 (2d ed. 1995 & 
1995-96 Supp.). For one particularly clear, recent statement see Dakota Indus., Inc. v. 
Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th Cir. 1993). "Generally, an appellate court 
cannot consider evidence that was not contained in the record below." /d. See also Federal 
Ins. Co. v. Halprin Supply Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993) ("This is because: [t]he 
only proper function of a court of appeals is to review the decision below on the basis of 
the record that was before the district court.") (quoting Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 
F.2d 1150, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 {1987) (alteration in quote)). 
Exceptions to these propositions are made in extremely compelling circumstances. 
Supplementation of the record has been permitted only when the "interest 
of justice" require consideration of evidence not in the record. Cases in which 
supplementation of the record has been permitted generally involve inmates or 
similarly situated petitioners who claim egregious constitutional violations. Those 
courts allowing supplementation emphasized the mistaken exclusion of documents 
from the record and that the party made no conscious decision to omit the 
documents. 
Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., No. 91-1496-PFK, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18015 at *22-*23 (D. 
Kan. Nov. I, 1995) (citations omitted) (quoting Millerv. Benson, 51 F.3d 166, 168 (8th Cir. 
1995) (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th Cir. 
1993). 
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on the law. 63 To undo the result of a trial based on new evidence requires 
an extraordinary showing on a motion to reopen made in the trial court.64 
Thus, judicial review of formal administrative proceedings resembles the 
standard judicial review model by its focus on the correctness of the 
agency's decision at the time it was rendered-looking only to evidence in 
the record to undercut or support the agency decision reviewed. 
It differs, however, in one particularly important way. An appellate 
court can disagree with a trial court's legal justification for the result that 
it reached on the factual record, but affirm nonetheless, by substituting 
other acceptable legal reasoning, as long as the factual premises of that 
reasoning find adequate factual support in the record before the court 
below.65 
As stated with great clarity in the Chenery lf6 case, review of formal 
administrative action is almost always different from appellate review of a 
trial court in this respect: the agency's decision must be sustainable based 
solely upon the reasoning it employed at the time of its decision.61 
63. As for limitation to facts properly before the lower court, see supra note 62. As 
to the law, however, matters are different. All courts, including appellate courts, must apply 
the law existing at the time the court disposes of the matter before it. United States v. 
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 103, IIO (1801). For a discussion of this point, see 
Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction and 
Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REv. 1189, I240 & n.238. 
64. Additional evidence for a jury trial may only be heard on a grant of a motion for 
a new trial, while additional evidence for a court trial may be heard on either a motion to 
reopen or a motion for a new trial. FED. R. CIR. PRO. 59( a). The granting of such motions 
is discretionary but typically requires a substantial showing to justify the measure. FED. R. 
CIR. PRO. 60(b)(2). AG Pro., Inc. v. Sakraida, 5I2 F.2d I41, 143 (5th Cir. 1975); In re 
Tuchrello, 43 B.R. 93, 96 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. I984); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. & 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § I2.I4 at 67 6-80 (3d ed. I985); II CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2859 at 30I-I0 (2d ed. I995). 
65. NLRB v. PIE Nationwide, Inc., 923 F.2d 506, 5I7-I8 (7th Cir. I99I) (contrasting, 
in dicta, power of court reviewing lower court's judgment with lack of power in PIE to 
reach decision on grounds not employed by agency whose decision is reviewed). 
66. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. I94 (I947). 
67. !d. at I96. This requirement antedates Chenery. See National Broadcasting Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190,227 (1943); Tagg Bros. v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 444-45 
(1930). The material required to support the agency's original rationale implicitly defined 
in National BroadcastingCo. was later adopted by the Court in Chenery. Compare National 
Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 190-97 with Chenery, 333 U.S. at 207. For a clear discussion 
of the development of this rule before enactment of the APA, see Susannah T. French, 
Judicial Review of the AdministrativeRecord in NEP A Cases, 8I CAL. L. REV. 929, 933-36 
(1993). The requirement of decision only on the record made before the agency was 
adopted clearly by the APA with respect to formal Proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1994) 
(making "[t]he transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests 
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If the agency's decision is not sustainable on the agency's original record 
based on its rationale at the time of decision, the reviewing court may not 
sustain the action on other reasoning it finds acceptable even though that 
reasoning seems well-supported by facts in the administrative record. 
Instead, it must strike down the agency action and remand for further 
consideration. 68 
The reasons for this follow from the prevailing assumptions of 
administrative law. An agency is created and staffed to exercise expert 
discretion in assessing evidence, making -predictions, and formulating 
policy.69 Judicial deference has long' extended, to some degree, even to 
filed in the proceeding ... the exclusive record for decision"). 
68. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196-97. See also Florida Power & Light Co. v Lorian, 470 
U.S. 729, 745 (1985) (describing propositions in question as fundamental principles of 
judicia\ review of agency action). 
/d. 
69. In Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196, the Court stated: 
When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule 
of administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing 
with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is 
authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds 
invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is 
powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to 
be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the 
domain which Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency. 
The first Chenery case, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) [hereinafter 
Chenery II] is also instructive on this point: 
The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon 
which the record discloses that its action was based. In confining our review to 
a judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which the Commission itself 
based its action, we do not disturb the settled rule that, inreviewing the decision 
of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct although the lower 
court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason. . . The reason for this 
rule is obvious. It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to 
reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court 
concluded should properly be based on another ground within the power of the 
appellate court to formulate. But it is also familiar appellate procedure that where 
the correctness of the lower court's decision depends upon a determination of fact 
which only a jury could make but which has not been made, the appellate court 
cannot take the place of the jury. Like considerations govern review of 
administrative orders. If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or 
judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, 
a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment. 
For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court 
cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an 
-- administrative agency. 
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an agency's interpretation of its enabling act_1° A court that tells an 
agency its decision was wrong based on the latter's legal reasoning from 
the record, but right based on other available legal reasoning, cannot be 
certain that the agency would have read the law or chosen to exercise its 
authority in that way. 71 
Id. at 87-88. 
70. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). While the usual view 
is that Chevron signals a significant increase in deference, some have suggested that it 
simply restates the law without intensifying it. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in 
the Supreme Court: Highlightsfromthe Marshal/Papers,23 ENVTI... L. REP. 10,606, 10,613 
(1993). Chevron itself suggests that any change it contemplated was not large scale: 
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations "has 
been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or 
reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full 
understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has 
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to 
agency regulations." 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (citations omitted). 
To lend weight to its view, the Chevron Court cited SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194 ( 1947). In Chenery, the Court concluded that the agency, while acting under the 
statutory "fair and equitable" standard, had developed a new principle of fairness: that 
corporate insiders often should not be permitted to reap all benefits of trading in their own 
companies' stock during a reorganization. ld at 204-09. The Court's view of the standard 
of judicial review for agency lawmaking under an enabling act is as follows: 
The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein a new principle is 
announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to ordinary 
administrative action .... 
* * * 
The Commission' sconclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative 
judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is 
the product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the 
problem, realization of statutory policies ... It is the type of judgment which 
administrative agencies are best equipped to make and which justifies use of the 
administrative process. Whether we agree or disagree with the result reached, it 
is an allowable judgment which we cannot disturb. 
Id (citation omitted). 
71. All of this explains why a reviewing court cannot rerationalize the result of an 
agency proceeding as it can with the result of an inferior court, but it does not explain why 
the focus is on the set of reasons that the agency found decisive at the time it reached its 
decision. Why limit the expert agency to reasons actually decisive? Why not allow it to 
substitute, during the course of judicial review, a satisfactory post-decision rationale for the 
true contemporaneous, but possibly defective, initial rationale? While practically speaking, 
this limitation rarely may make a positive difference, it seems an attempt to provide 
incentive for an agency to conduct its original deliberations with care. How often such 
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These principles for formal proceedings are derived from a federal 
common law of administrative procedure recognized and applied by the 
courts well before the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.72 While 
Overton Park makes clear that this law is viable today, it does not make 
clear whether it is seen as existing along side the APA or as implicitly 
incorporated in that statute's provisions for judicial review.73 
2. Overton Park's Formalization of Informal Proceedings 
a. Some Background Concerning Informal Proceedings Under the APA 
Some background is necessary in order to understand the shifting nature 
of informal proceedings under the APA and to understand Overton Park's 
role in increasing their formality. The Administrative Procedure Act's 
recognition of a category of informal administrative action can be 
understood in a variety of ways. First, from a public choice perspective, 
the APA might be seen as a compromise of a myriad of interests asserted 
by diverse groups who influenced the legislative process. 74 Some of these 
groups would be helped and others injured by intensifying procedural rights 
and judicial review in a wide variety of agency contexts. 75 Second, the 
APA could be understood as based on public values, specifically as an 
attempt to provide only those protections whose economic and social costs 
are justified by the benefits they provide. 
From this second perspective, informal proceedings are a set of 
proceedings by a wide variety of agencies on widely differing subjects, but 
possessing a common characteristic. That characteristic is the conclusion . 
incentive is decisive, however, is a matter of conjecture. 
72. See supra note 68. 
73. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1970) (citing 
Chenery) (not permitting agency to offer new justifications-described as "post hoc" 
rationales-but rather requiring agency to provide either contemporaneous or later 
explanation of agency's original reasons). 
74. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), the Court 
reflected on the Act's significance: 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, which as we 
have noted elsewhere was not only "a new, basic and comprehensive regulation of 
procedures in many agencies," but was also a legislative enactment which settled 
"long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enacts a formula upon which 
opposing social and political forces have come to rest." 
/d. at 523 (citation omitted) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 
(1950)). 
75. /d. 
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that all of these are matters as to which more formal procedures and 
exacting judicial review are not cost-justified. On this view, if agency 
proceedings are thoughtfully aligned to the formal or the informal set, then 
informal proceedings presumably would be either matters in which little 
was at stake, or matters in which additional procedures would yield little 
extra fairness, or both. This presumption follows the familiar and 
analogously apt procedural due process balancing calculus.76 
Circumstances at the time of the APA's drafting made a division 
between the formal and informal categories on fairness grounds seem more 
natural than it does today. Given the shape of the regulatory .landscape at 
that time, it was much easier to sort proceedings into two groups in terms 
ofthe importance ofthe interests at stake: (1) matters touching upon private 
rights protected to some degree by due process,77 and (2) other interests 
76. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), offers the Supreme Court's most 
recent general formulation of the balancing calculus: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interestthat will be affected 
by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment'sinterest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id .. at 335. 
Matthews is not the first case to recognize the appropriateness of a balancing in the 
procedural due process context. Due process, particularly in its application to adjudicatory 
procedure, has long been recognized to involve balancing to compromise public interests 
with private rights. See North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 319-
20 (1908) (considering competing claims of owners of private property summarily destroyed 
and public interest in eliminating probable danger, and concluding no hearing was necessary 
before destruction). In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 
(1951), Justice Frankfurter explained: 
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in 
which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the 
procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary 
whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good 
accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the 
judicial judgment. 
!d. at 163 (Frankfurter, J ., concurring). 
Because the APA is not clear as to which proceedings are entitled to formal 
procedures, the most rational form of allocation would involve balancing the benefits of 
formality against the costs. 
77. The Court has described the AP A as a response in large part to the "[m ]ultiplication 
offederal administrative agencies and expansion of their functions to include adjudications 
which have serious impact on private rights .... " Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 36-37; 
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in fidelity to law, short of recognized rights. The former largely covered 
the interests of business, although a smaller set of matters involving 
individual liberty was also included.78 While substantive due process no 
longer provided business interests meaningful protection from regulation 
itself,79 procedural fairness in the making and application of regulations 
.remained an important value.80 
Procedural due process, as augmented by provisions of the APA, 
provided certain protections in these cases where property, and, less 
frequently, liberty, were at stake. These protections ensured that agency 
action which reduced the value of business operations was authorized by 
statute and that the agency acted only on a defensible view of the facts, in 
the determination of which the business had meaningful input. 
Most other interests, however, went largely unprotected, or, rather, the 
agency was seen as the adequate and sole protector of·a generalized public 
interest, including those particular segments of the public with very strong 
interests in an agency's performance of its statutory duties.81 For the most 
see also Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 824 (1978) ( extendingpresumptionofformality beyond adjudications affecting classical 
liberty and property rights to all significant and non-routine agency adjudications, thus 
implicitly balancing, at some level of generality, what is at stake to private interests and 
value of additional procedures against their cost to public interest). 
78. Some agencies, particularly those dealing with immigration and military authorities, 
had enormous powers to make decisions affecting liberty interests. Although these decisions 
were often subject to judicial review, the reviewing courts were required to give great 
deference to many crucial agency determinations. See United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 
253 (1905) (refusing to allow de novo review of agency decision excluding alien who 
claimed citizenship); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) (stating in dicta that 
review of draft board decision underlying military induction notice was unavailable except 
for claims that agency acted without jurisdiction). 
79. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking state maximum hour 
law as depriving workers and employers of liberty without due process of law) with West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 ~.S. 379 (1937) (upholj:ling state minimum wage law whose 
substance was challenged under due process) and United ~tates v. Carotene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144 ( 193 8) (upholding federal law barring sale of certain products whose substance 
was challenged under due process). In Carotene Products, the Court seemed to abjure the 
power to strike down ordinary economic legislation as a violation of due process (or equal 
protection) unless wildly and obviously irrational on the face of the legislation. For a 
general discussion of this shift, see GEOFFRY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786-
811 (2d ed. 1991). 
80. See Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 36-40 (describing concerns about administrative 
fairness which, along with other concerns, led to APA's passage). 
81. This proposition is best illustrated by shifts in the law of standing starting in the 
1940's but gaining real momentum in the 1970's. The primary criterion for standing was 
a chissicallegal-interest of the sort also protected by procedural due process. For example, 
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part, even these specially interested segments of the public were accorded 
no meaningful procedural rights before an agency and were likely to lack 
standing to challenge final agency action in court.82 
Competitor B, though actually injured, would not have had standing to challenge the 
government's grant of a license or other competitive advantage to his Competitor A, 
although arguably granted in violation of a statute governing the circumstances in which 
such grant would be appropriate. Denial of standing was based on the premises that (I) no 
one has a right to have government protection absent some particular constitutional or legal 
source, and (2) that the limits in the statute granted no private rights but were there to 
protect the public interest-an interest with which the agency could be trusted. Consequent-
ly, Competitor B was viewed as no more a serious candidate for standing than some 
otherwise uninterested person who abstractly wanted agencies to obey statutory limits. See 
Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 
1436 n.18 (1988) (concluding that such person would have been treated as "bystander" 
instead of player). 
This slowly began to change with cases such as FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 
309 U.S. 470 (1940), Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942), and 
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
Each of these cases awarded someone in Competitor B's position standing to challenge an 
advantage granted by the government to Competitor A. These cases were based on a 
reading of each statute in issue as granting competitors standing as "private Attorney 
Generals." Ickes, 134 F.2d at 704. It was not until Association of Data Processing Service 
Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), that the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994), was read as 
presuming that anyone whose interest was arguably among the zone of interests specially 
protected by a statute would have standing to sue. The new view was based on a number 
of elements, including ( 1) a belief that interests other than traditional property inter-
ests-such as an interest in observance of environmental laws-were entitled to some 
protection; (2) a less worshipful view of agency expertise; and (3) a genera\ distrust of 
government based on the fear, in particular, that agencies often were controlled by the very 
businesses they were created to regulate. These views made it more crucial that interested 
non-agency actors could challenge agency action to assure regulation in the public interest. 
See PETER L.S1RAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINIS1RA TIVE LAW 464-65, 1133-
38 (9th ed. 1995); Sunstein, supra at 1434-45. This phenomenon manifested itself not only 
in a liberalization of standing before courts, but also of "standing" to participate in agency 
proceedings to various degrees. S1RAUSS ET AL., supra at 464-77. 
These changing expectations also manifested themselves in increasingly activist 
judicial review of agency action, often at the request of those who were newly granted 
standing. This took two forms. First, heightened review of informal agency action was 
sanctioned by Overton Park itself. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 420 (1970). See infra notes 108-25. Second, courts required agencies _to use 
procedures beyond the minimum required by the APA in order to develop a better record 
on which a court might assess the rationality of agency action. This second development 
was halted by the court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 
548 (1978). 
82. See supra note 81 (discussing criteria for standing to participate in judicial review 
of agency action). 
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It was proceedings involving these lesser interests, in which the agency 
was seen as an appropriate sole representative of the public interest, which 
defined the original set of informal administrative action. Indeed, this 
accounts for the confusing fact that such action-whether rulemaking or 
adjudicative-historically has been called "legislative" in a secondary sense 
of that word. 
One reason for this strange usage of "legislative" was that, when neither 
liberty nor property rights were at stake, the agency was permitted to gather 
information to ground its action in virtually any way it wished-a freedom 
reminiscent of that which is enjoyed by a legislature or one of its 
committees. Because there were no formal proceedings into which 
evidence had to be admitted, there was no restriction on ex parte contacts. 
Consequently, commissioners could consult with industry representatives 
without hearing the opposing views or even notifying the opposing 
interests.83 Such action also resembled legislation in another respect. ·On 
judicial review of issues resolved by the agency, other than issues of law, 
courts subjected the agency's decision to an "arbitrary and capricious" 
scrutiny which resembled the toothless rational basis test applied to 
'83. In The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1965), the court 
stated that: 
The final contention advanced in behalf of the plaintiff is that the record of 
the hearings before the Board does not sustain the validity of the regulation or the 
need therefor. This contention seems to be based on a misconception of the nature 
of a rule-making proceeding. Rule-making is a legislative process. It is neither 
judicial, administrative, nor quasi-judicial. An agency performing a legislative 
function need not proceed on evidence formally presented at hearings. It may act 
on the basis of data contained in its own files, on information informally gained 
by members of the body, on its own expertise, or on its own views or opinions. 
It is not necessary for the regulatory agency to cause to be submitted at hearings 
evidence that would support its rule-making decisions. The regulation ultimately 
promulgated need not be sustained by evidence. The purposes of rule-making 
hearings are to give an opportunity to interested parties to submit data and facts, 
and to present their views. Consequently, the Court does not review a record of 
such hearings as it does records in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeqings. Such 
hearings are analogous to hearings conducted by [ c ]ongressional [ c ]ommittees. An 
Act of Congress need not be supported by formal evidence introduced at hearings. 
/d. at 892. This view changed in the D.C. Circuit between Overton Park and Vermont 
Yankee. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978) (finding ex parte contacts improper in informal 
rulemaking); see also Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte 
Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 ADMIN. L. REV., 377, 379, 380 
n.8 (1978) (discussing whether Home Box Office survived Vermont Yankee). 
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determine the rationality of ordinary legislation challenged as violating 
substantive due process. 84 
Passage of the APA in 1946 provided some new, but still relatively 
limited, procedural protections for parties interested in informal agency 
rulemaking. 85 In such proceedings, an agency was required to propose 
rules publicly, and to receive and consider comments from all interested 
persons. 86 The effect of this requirement was limited in four ways. First, 
courts treated the requirement that the agency consider comments as 
hortatory. 87 Second, in deciding to issue a rule, an agency could rely on 
material never exposed to the comment process. 88 Third, certain rules, 
including interpretive rules and policy statements, were exempted even 
from the requirements of notice and comment.89 Fourth, agencies 
possessed an almost unlimited latitude to avoid the APA's rulemaking 
84. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) 
(holding that agency did not need to make specific findings to support promulgated rule, 
much like legislature need not make such findings, and finding reasons for special deference 
to agency conclusions not fully explained). The passage of the APA requirement of a 
"concise general statement," 5 U.S.C. § 553( c) ( 1994), did not significantly affectthe Pacijlc 
States Box & Basket rule because the APA provision was not read to compel specific 
findings to justify a ru)emaking. ATIORNEY GEN., MANUAL ON TilE APA 32 (1947). Case 
law before Overton Park suggests that if a court finds the basis and purpose of a rule 
obvious, a supporting statement is not required. Hoving Corp. v. FTC, 290 F.2d 803 (2d 
Cir. 1961 ). Overton Park was the first step in Supreme Court case law toward searching 
review of agency action. By 1983, in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 ( 1983), the Court expressly rejected any similarity between the rational 
basis review applied to legislative action and the arbitrary and capricious standard of review 
for agency 
action. The Court strongly suggested that it would be less deferential to an agency's actions 
taken to fulfill its statutory mandate. /d. at 43 n.9. 
85. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1994). 
86. /d. 
87. Before Overton Park's requirements of (I) review on the agency record; (2) offer 
of an explanation of a rational connection between an agency's statutory authority, the 
record, and its decision; and (3) thorough review of those materials, it was impractical to 
require serious consideration. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. This 
requirement gained further momentum after Overton Park when the D.C. Circuit required 
that the record or an agency's explanation respond to any significant comments apparently 
undercutting the rationality ofits decision. Portland Cement Ass'n y. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 
375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). 
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing agency's ability to gather 
information through ex parte contacts). 
89. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1994). 
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requirements by using specific adjudications as vehicles for announcing 
general rules.90 
Stripped down as they were, rulemaking proceedings, as described above, 
were still more procedurally exacting than informal adjudication. For the 
latter, the APA provided few, if any, procedural protections. 91 
Thus, in both informal rulemaking and informal adjudications, an agency 
operated more like a legislature or a legislative committee than a court. 
This limited restrictions model-limited both in terms of agency procedure 
and intensity of judicial review-was the model of informal agency action 
employed by the courts during the early years of the APA.92 
Over the years, the prevailing conception of informal action edged away 
from the limited restrictions end of the continuum. This change was driven 
by new varieties of regulation which affected, in important ways, interests 
of citizens not traditionally recognized by the legal system, typified by 
environmental protection legislation.93 It was also characterized by a 
general reappraisal of the desirability of allowing an agency to be the sole 
champion of the public interest in non constitutional cases, concerned with 
the integrity of government, particularly the executive branch and agencies 
captured by regulated interests.94 It was driven in some respect by an 
emerging skepticism about the existence of an intelligible public interest 
having some meaning other than the desires of the victors in interest group 
warfare. As new important, but nonproprietary, interests appeared, and as 
confidence in agencies waned, the requirements for informal action moved 
somewhat toward those required for formal proceedings, affording more 
procedural protections in actions before the agency and more intensive 
judicial review. 
Even at the time of greatest movement toward formalizing informal 
proceedings, in the early to mid 1970's, differences between the two types 
90. SEC v. Chenery, Corp., 323 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947) (indicating that agency's 
choice ofrulemaking or adjudication as vehicle for making policy lies primarily in agency's 
discretion). 
91. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994). 
92. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1971, 24 ADMIN. L. REv. 
299, 306 (1972} (describing Overton Park as delineating new procedure between formal 
proceedings and no procedure at all). For a fuller version of the Schwartz quotation see text 
accompanying infra note 108. 
93. Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1441-42 (commenting on judicial enlargement of 
standing in variety of new regulatory settings); Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306 (commenting 
on judicial enlargement of procedures required in variety of new regulatory settings). 
94. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 81, at 464-65; Sunstein, supra note 81, at 1443-44. 
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of proceedings remained striking.95 Moreover, since that time, there has 
been some movement back toward less formality.96 
The time of greatest formalization of informal proceedings was the 
period between the decision of Overton ParlC7 and the decision in 
vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, a case which severely 
limited, but did not entirely roll back, the process of formalization.98 
During this period, informal proceedings and court review followed 
somewhat formalized features, some stemming from Overton Park and 
some even antedating it slightly. 99 
During those years, the notion of participation by comments in 
rulemaking was expanded to require an agency to make available for public 
comment any factual material on which it would significantly rely in 
justifying its rule. 100 This is, essentially, a diluted, non-oral form of cross 
95. Compare the requirements offormal proceedings under 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57, which 
resemble those for civil trials in courts, with the even more demanding requirements for 
informal action devised between Overton Park and Vermont Yankee, described infra notes 
100-04. 
96. Except for some small set of truly exceptional cases, Vermont Yankee ended the 
lower federal courts' practice of occasionally requiring agencies to conduct their informal 
proceedings with more safeguards than the minimum required by the Constitution, the APA, 
or more specific statutes. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 
524, 543 (1978). However, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. The LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 
(1990), seemed to protect Overton Park's apparent innovations, including (1) review on a 
record, (2) meaningful agency explanation of its decision, and (3) careful rationality review, 
as explications of the APA's judicial review requirements. !d. at 654. 
97. See Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306 (describing Overton Park as delineating new 
procedure that works in between formal proceedings and no procedure at all). 
98. 435 U.S. 519, 524, 543 (1978) (prohibiting courts, except in most compelling 
circumstances, from requiring agencies to provide procedures going beyond minimum 
required by Constitution, APA, or more specific statute). 
99. While Overton Park was, at the highest level, an endorsement, extension and 
clarification ofthe trend toward formalization, the trend had its origins slightly earlier in the 
United States Courts of Appeals. See Automotive Parts and Accessories v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 
330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (requiring that agency's explanation of its action be reasonably 
detailed, although this partially may have been result of special requirements of enabling 
act). See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN ANDBYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 478-79 
(8th ed. 1986), including Automotive Parts in the vanguard of the "hard look" movement 
toward intensification of judicial scrutiny of informal agency action. 
100. Portland Cement Assoc. v. Ruchelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977). See also 
Neil D. McFeeley, Judicial Review of Informal AdministrativeRulemaking, 1984 DUKE L.J. 
347, 353 nn.47-48 (1984). 
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examination. Some courts did require oral cross-examination. 101 Some 
courts imposed a ban on ex parte contacts, thereby making it likely that all 
information considered by the agency, whether deemed significant or not, 
would be available to the parties. 102 Such information would be ayailable, 
if not for an additional round of comments, then at least for consideration 
on judicial review.103 Additionally, the largely unenforceable requirement 
that agencies consider comments was translated into the real requirement 
that an agency, in explaining its decision, respond to any significant 
comment which challenged its rationality. 104 
Both rulemaking and adjudication were subjected to the requirement that 
an agency explain its decision in some reasonable fashion, and that the 
explanation rationally connect the decision with the record. 105 In an 
informal proceeding, the record was the material before the agency when 
it reached its decision. 106 Finally, as to the intensity of judicial review, 
the Supreme Court began to require serious scrutiny of informal agency 
action.107 
b. Overton Park's Role in Formalization 
While the lower federal courts already had begun to suggest an 
intensifYing of procedures in informal proceedings, it was the Supreme 
Court itself which most dramatically signaled real change. As Bernard 
Schwartz said in his commentary shortly after the case was decided: 
101. The Court in Vermont Yankee read the opinion of the court below as ordering cross 
examination in an informal rulemaking and reversed on grounds that courts should not, on 
their own authority, augment the procedural requirements of the AP A. Vermont Yankee, 435 
U.S. at 524, 541-43. See also International Harvester Corp. v. Rucklehaus, 478 F.2d 615, 
630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affirming power to order cross-examination in informal rulemaking 
but declining to do so in instant case). 
102. United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519,536-43 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-59 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). 
103. This flows from Overton Park' sand Camp v. Pitts'sdefinition of record for judicial 
review as everything that the agency considered in reaching its decision. Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1970); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). 
I 04. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 ("It is not in 
keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised by comments which are of 
cogent materiality, completely unanswered."); Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 392-94. 
105. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 417-20. 
106. !d. at 420. 
107. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting portions of Overton Park 
describing judicial review as "probing" and "in-depth"). 
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Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe is the first Supreme Court decision 
to deal with a new type of administrative procedure that is halfway between the 
traditional, formal regulatory procedure and no procedure at all. The technique 
referred to has developed as the focus of concern in our administrative law and has 
begun to shift from the older areas of regulatory administration (covered by the 
formal APA requirements) to newer areas which reflect the assumption of new 
functions of government. 108 
It is important to note precisely how Overton Park did and did not 
endorse a more formal model for informal proceedings. Commentators 
often note that informal proceedings are distinguished from formal 
proceedings precisely by virtue of the fact that the latter are decided "on 
the record" and the former are not. 109 The Supreme Court has mandated 
that, at least in rulemaking proceedings, the presence or absence in an 
enabling act of the words on the record, is normally a dispositive indicator 
of whether the APA' s formal trial-type provisions are triggered. 110 
One of Overton Park's formalizing innovations is to make clear that, in 
informal proceedings which are not on the record in the technical sense of 
the APA, there is, nevertherless, a record in another sense. 111 Certainly, 
by definition, there is no precisely defined procedural record comprising all 
evidence admitted and subject to cross examination. 112 According to 
Overton Park itself, the record in an informal proceeding is all the material 
that the agency considered in reaching its decision. 113 Commentators have 
criticized this notion as making it hard to determine exactly what the record 
is. 114 For present purposes, the argument is not concerned with the 
wisdom of basing review on such an informal record. Rather, the key point 
is that this was the Overton Park view of informal records and it continues 
to be the Supreme Court's view. 115 
108. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306. 
109. See 5 U.S. C.§§ 553(c), 554(a), (c)(2); seealso United States v. Florida East Coast 
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 234 (1973). 
110. /d. at 234-38. 
111. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 418-19; WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISlRA-
TIVE LAW 824 (7th ed. 1979); J. Skelly Wright, Commentary: Rulemakingand Judicial 
Review, 30 ADMIN. L. REV. 461, 464 (1978). 
112. 401 U.S. at 420. 
113. /d. 
114. William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 
38, 59 ( 1975). 
115. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (stating simply that "review is to be base'd on 
the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his 
decision"). The Court never specifically defines the term "record." Contrast this vague 
account with the notion of record in formal proceedings described in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57 
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The significance that the Court accorded this different sort of record, 
once identified, is exactly that which is generally accorded to more formal 
and identifiable records produced in formal decisions. Any specific 
factfinding, crucial to an agency's decision, must be adequately supported 
by the evidentiary record which was before the agency when it acted} 16 
If the purely legal reasoning is adequate ("the statute permits us to ban 
dangerous p'roducts"), then the decision stands or falls depending on 
whether the factual record adequately supports the factual portion ("this is 
a dangerous product"Y 17 of the agency's actual reasoning to its conclusion 
("therefore it is banned"). If the court decides that the statute and record 
supports a second reason for banning the. drug (ineffectiveness, for 
example), it nevertheless cannot uphold the ban on a basis not relied on by 
the agency to support its decision. Rather, it would have to remand to 
allow for initial agency consideration of this possible alternative 
ground. 118 
(1994). See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 139-42 (1973) (noting that "[t]he entire 
administrative record was_placed before the court .... The focal point for judicial review 
should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially 
in the reviewing court." This statement made it reasonably clear that what is placed before 
court by agency is not necessarily a~ministrative record for review in Overton Park sense). 
At one point in its opinion in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorian, 470 U.S. 729 
(1985), the Court casually refers to the record for review as "the record the agency presents 
to the reviewingcourt." /d. at 744 (emphasis added). In another portion of its opinion, the 
Lorian Court calls for remand if "the record before the agency does not support the agency 
action." !d. (empha!)is added). This clearly is the Overton view and remains so today. It 
is not in keeping with the remainder of the Overton Park opinion or with subsequent 
Supreme Court and lower court opinions to believe that an agency can withhold important 
information which it considered but which undercuts its decision from a reviewing court. 
I I6. See supra note 69 (quoting from Chenery). Compare this treatment with Over_ton 
Park, 401 U.S. at 4I9-20. 
I I 7. Of course, this usage of "factual" is to cover predictions and many other hard to 
classify judgments about the world as opposed to judgments about the meaning oflegal texts 
and traditions. 
II8. In Camp, the Court stated: 
[I]n the present case there was contemporaneous explanation of the agency 
decision. The explanation may have been correct, but it surely indicated the 
determinative reas~n for the final action taken: the finding that a new bank was an 
uneconomic venture in light of the banking needs and the banking services already 
available in the surrounding community. The validity of the Comptroller's action 
mu$t, therefore, stand or fall on the propriety of that finding, judged, of course, by 
the appropriate standard of review. If that finding is not sustainable on the 
administrative record made, then the Comptroller's decision must be vacated and 
~lie matter remanded to him for further consideration. 
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Overton Park also fonnalizes infonnal proceedings in another way. It 
requires that an agency adequately explain its decision, even though the 
court did not explain the meaning of "adequate."119 There are several 
provisions of the APA which might be viewed as requiring that some 
greatly stripped-down version of a judicial opinion accompany informal 
agency decisions, in order to provide an explanation. 120 The Overton 
Park Court cites none of these provisions, but rather indicates that an 
explanation is necessary to facilitate judicial review. 121 The Court makes 
clear that if such an explanation is not supplied along with the decision, or 
provided shortly thereafter, the actual reasoning of the agency can be made 
a subject of inquiry in the judicial review proceedings. 122 Note however, 
that the Court here applies the fonnal model to infonnal proceedings. The 
-issue is not how an agency can most convincingly rationalize its decision 
during judicial review, but whether its actual reasons for acting at the time 
it decided the matter can withstand scrutiny. 123 
Finally, rounding out the picture of how Overton Park fonnalized 
infonnal proceedings, it legitimated and perhaps intensified a trend toward 
.increased judicial scrutiny of agency action, particularly infonnal agency 
action, under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The standard was a 
/d. at 143. Furthermore, in Florida Power & Light Co. v Lorian, 470 U.S. 729 (1985), the 
Court found: 
If the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency 
has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot 
evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the 
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for 
additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally 
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to 
reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry. 
/d. at 744. 
119. The only guidance the Court does provide to this question is that "post hoc" 
rationalizations of agency actions are "an inadequate basis for review." Overton Park, 401 
U.S. at 419. 
120. For example, the APA provides that an agency denial of a party's request must 
include a "brief statement of the grounds for denial." 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994). 
Furthermore, after promulgating new rules, an agency must "adopt a concise general 
statement of their basis and purpose." /d. § 553(c). 
121. 401 U.S. at420. See also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 
(1990) (grounding Overton Park's rules in the requirements for effective judicial review 
implicit in APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706). 
122. The Court states that ·'it may be that the only way there can be effective judicial 
review is by examining the decisionmakers themselves." Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
123. Presumably this is reflected in the Court's rejection of post hoc rationalizations. 
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419. 
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weak one, calling for scrutiny resembling that applied to ordinary economic 
acts of Congress challenged for violating substantive due process. 124 
Overton Park moved beyond this earlier view to require real scrutiny: 
Even though there is no de novo review in this case and the Secretary's [decision] 
does not have ultimately to meet the substantial-evidence test, the generally 
applicable standards of§ 706 require the reviewing court to engage in a substantial 
inquiry. Certainly, the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of 
regularity. But that presumption is not to shield his action from_ a thorough, 
probing, in-depth review. 125 
II. THE TWO EXCEPTIONS OVERTON PARK RECOGNIZED TO ITS OWN 
"ON THE RECORD RULE" 
While Overton Park generally required that judicial review be confined 
to scrutiny of the administrative record, it recognized exceptions. 126 In 
these two circumstances, the Court permitted some form of de novo judicial 
review, meaning that the validity of an order or regulation would be 
determined based upon a record at least partially made before the reviewing 
court. 127 The Court described these exceptions as follows: "First, such de 
novo review is authorized when the action is adJudicatory in nature and the 
agency factfinding procedures are inadequate . . . . [Second,] there may be 
independent factfinding when issues that were not before the agency are 
raised in a proceeding to enforce non-adjudicatory agency action .... " 128 
The Court cited no caselaw as authority for this proposition, but rather 
referred to a House of Representatives Report129 accompanying the APA 
and to Louis Jaffee's treatise. 130 The Committee Report certainly supports 
such a suggestion, however, it is more easily read as suggesting that all 
informal administrative action should be reviewed not on the record before 
the agency, but de novo, on a record made in the reviewing court's 
proceedings: 
124. PETER L. SlRAUSS ET AL, supra note 81, at 602-03 (citing Pacific States Box and 
Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935}, as example of old standards of arbitrary and 
capricious review resembling toothless rational basis standard applied to most economic 
legislation to determine if their substance comports with due process). 
125. 401 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted). 
126. !d. 
127. !d. 
128. !d. 
129. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). 
130. LOUIS JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CON1ROL OF ADMINISlRATIVE ACTION 359 (1965). 
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In short, where a rule or order is not required by statute to be made after 
opportunity for agency hearing and to be reviewed only on the [formal] record 
thereof, the facts pertinent to any relevant questions of law must be tried and 
determined de novo by the reviewing court respecting either the validity or 
application of such rule or order-because facts necessary to the determination of 
any relevant question of law must be determined of record somewhere and, if 
Congress has not provided that an agency shall do so, then the record must be 
made in court. 131 
This clearly supports Nathaniel Nathanson's claim that all informal 
agency action was meant to be reviewed de novo. 132 But across-the-board 
de novo review of informal agency action is antithetical to the On the 
Record Rule of Overton Park, and to the spirit of other contemporaneous 
Supreme Court cases.133 It is difficult to tell whether Overton Park rests 
on a true judicial mistake about the original intention underlying the APA 
or upon a dynamic statutory interpretation aimed at modernizing the 
statute.134 What is clear after Overton Park is that, currently, we have a 
system in which the On the Record Rule is the rule and de novo review is 
the exception. 
If the Supreme Court has, in effect, stood the original meaning of the 
APA on its head in this respect, does the legislative history provide any 
help in understanding why? Perhaps it does, by making clear the sorts of 
cases in which the legislature thought that this sort of de novo review 
would operate. Examined closely, the legislative history reveals that the 
emphasis was on the small set of cases in which informal administrative 
action could harm constitutional rights. 
The focus of the legislative history was on due process. In cases not 
involving liberty or property, the absence of a record posed fewer 
difficulties for two reasons stemming from the nature of informal 
proceedings at that time, as discussed above. First, aside from those few 
131. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. 45 (1946); S. REP. No. 752, 79th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945). 
132. Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations 
and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedures Act and Other 
Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 763-65 n.8 (1975). See also Stephen F. 
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and 
Empirica1Analysis,42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401,419-20 n.76 (1975) (advocating de novo review 
when substantive validity of agency rule turned upon resolution of factual claim). 
133. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); United 
States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
134. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. DYNAMIC STATUTORY IN1ERPRETATION (1994) 
(arguing throughoutthat statutory interpretation ought to consider post enactment events and 
values). 
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whose classical property or liberty rights were impinged by informal action, 
the remainder of affected persons were much less likely to possess standing 
under the more rigid standing requirements prevailing at the time. 135 
Second, the nearly totally deferential standard of review of informal 
proceedings which prevailed before Overton Park136 suggested that 
production of a record normally would be a waste of time, because a 
reviewing court was almost certain to uphold the challenged agency despite · 
what the record revealed. 137 
A change in the regulatory landscape since 1946 has caused the APA to 
be reinterpreted. Attempts have been made to apply its provisions to a set 
of problems for which the APA was not designed. 138 The older style 
regulatory pattern pitted the agency as sole representative of the public 
interest against individual property and liberty interests. 139 SEC and 
immigration orders provide an example of each of these, respectively. As 
newer forms of regulatio'n, such as environmental regulation, were devised, 
a middle ground of interests was recognized in which a party had 
administrative and judicial standing even without a Fifth Amendment 
liberty or property interest. 140 With both the side effects of regulation or 
non-regulation raising the stakes for broad .spectrums of the citizenry, and 
"agency-capture theory" suggesting that agencies alone could not be trusted 
with the public interest, courts began to recognize public interest group and 
even individual standing. 141 
Real judicial scrutiny of agency action, at the request of those affected, 
seemed in order, where the stakes were as serious as, for example, safe 
nuclear waste disposal or the disruption of a public park (as in Overton 
Park)}42 In Florida East Coast Railway, however, the Court rejected an 
interpretation of the APA which would have viewed many of these 
proceedings as formal and subject to the APA's trial-like provisions!43 
135. See Sunstein, supra note 8 I, at I 434-45 (discussing narrow view of standing as tied 
only to classical legal concept, invaded by regulation and not by beneficiaries of regulatory 
statutes claiming under-enforcement by agencies). 
136. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
137. /d. 
138. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306 (considering procedure required of agencies and 
requirements for judicial review in new regulatory landscape); Sunstein, supra note 8I, at 
1443-45 (dealing with enlargement of standing to seek judicia\ review ofissues posed under 
newer regulatory provisions). 
139. Sunstein, supra note 8I, at I436-37. 
I40. /d. at I442. 
I41. See supra note 81. 
I42.' Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306. 
I43. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 4IO U.S. 224, 238-48 (I973). 
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When Florida East Coast Railway's informal classification of most 
agency proceedings was combined with Overton Park's limitation of 
judicial review to the record of actual agency deliberations, the pressure 
became even greater to formalize informal proceedings in order to assure 
fuller agency consideration and a richer record for review. When vermont 
Yankee later limited procedures in informal proceedings to those required 
by the APA, some lower courts and some commentators reacted by 
attempting to find ways around the On the Record Rule so that what they 
saw as appropriately informed judicial review could continue. 
Despite this, Overton Park, Florida East Coast Railway and the later 
vermont Yankee decision all seem aimed at homogenized, and relatively 
lax, administrative procedures and judicial review for nearly all cases. The 
level of intensity is pegged somewhere between the requirements of formal 
proceedings under sections 556 and 557, and the nearly negligible intensity 
of informal procedures as interpreted in the early days under the APA. 144 
As presaged in Overton Park and revealed most clearly in Vermont Yankee, 
the procedures and review would move slightly away from the negligible 
end of the spectrum. · Even if the APA had intended de novo review for 
most informal cases, such review would no longer be applicable. This is 
illustrated in the very narrow circumstances in which Overton Park 
recognized that de novo review of agency action was warranted. This can 
be demonstrated more dramatically by the Court's failure to use even the 
exceptions that it recognized in Overton Park. 
There are almost no federal cases in which courts used either of the 
"exceptions" recognized in Overton Park to justify a reviewing agency 
action on an evidentiary record made or augmented in a judicial proceed-
ing.145 It should not be surprising that these exceptions were ipsit dixits 
on the part of the Overton Park Court, and remain so today. They run 
completely contrary to the Overton Park Court's own model of administra-
tive law, however different that may be from the world of the APA 
framers. 
144. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 306. 
145. But see Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 782-84 (5th Cir. 1979), which allowed 
a federal district to hold hearings that an agency should have held in a proper way and 
finally dispose of the propriety of the sanction imposed by the agency against the plaintiff. 
Porter has been described as the only one to use an Overton Park exception. Levin, Scope 
of Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 
239, 273-74 (1986). See also ALFRED C. AMAN JR. AND WILLIAM T. MAYTON, 
ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW 459 n.7 (1993). 
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A. The First Exception: "When the Action Is Adjudicatory in Nature 
and the Agency Fact.finding Procedures Are Inadequate" 
The normal protocol for any defect in an agency decision is remand, for 
the reasons of expertise and presumed congressional intent. 146 This is true 
whether the defect lies in the procedural rules themselves or in the 
application of those rules to specific problems. On the one hand, if an 
agency has procedures which, on paper, are adequate under the APA and 
other relevant law, but misapplies them, the courts remand for an 
appropriate hearing before the agency. 147 On the other hand, if an 
agency's written procedures violate relevant law, a Court presumably would 
strike them down and remand the case, requiring the agency to formulate 
new procedures to use on remand. 148 
Under these circumstances, why would a court hear evidence going to 
the substantive merits of the agency decision? If in Chenery II the SEC 
had applied a procedural rule requiring facts to be found with a ouija board, 
there can be no doubt that the Court would have struck down that rule and 
remanded for more conventional agency factfinding. If agency procedure 
is sufficiently flawed to permit the court to set aside the agency action, 
what is the point in developing substantive material not considered by the 
agency? Presumably substantive review should occur once the agency 
reaches a procedurally correct decision. 
146. In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorian, 470 U.S. 729 (1985), the Court stated: 
If the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency 
has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot 
evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the 
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for 
additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally 
empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to 
reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry. 
!d. at 744. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). 
147. See Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(permitting remand where agency fails to follow correct procedure); United States v. 
Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969) (deciding to strike agency action when agency 
deviates from its own procedures); Bunyard v. Hotel, 702 F. Supp. 820 (D. Nev. 1988) 
(finding that agency failed to interpret and apply CFR regulations correctly in remand); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 284 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) 
(allowing court power to remand where agency erroneously excluded evidence). 
14~. See National Distillers & Chern. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 498 F. 
Supp .. 707 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd, 662 F.2d 754 (TC?mp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that 
agency must follow procedures within constraints of due process). 
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Even in the unusual case in which the agency is so incompetent that it 
cannot function appropriately, the solution is not for the court to become 
the agency, but for the court to disable the agency from making decisions 
until the political branches force the agency into sufficient compliance with 
the law. 
Potentially, there may be a very small set of cases, bordering on the null 
set, within the first Overton Park exception. These might include truly 
exceptional cases in which a court needs to hear evidence going to the 
substantive merits of the agency decision, so that the court could take on 
the function of the agency during an emergency while the agency is 
disabled. This would occur only in those rare instances in which a court 
concluded that either the Constitution or the agency's enabling act itself 
required the court to so act in the interim. There are some scenarios in 
which this might occur; 149 it is doubtful, however, that it ever will. 
149. Assume that a statutory entitlement program administered by an agency creates a 
right to receipt of immediate benefits. If so, depending on the urgency, it might make sense 
for courts to adjudicate entitlement under the program, where they find an agency has 
demonstrated an inability to do so on its own. If the program vests receipt of benefits 
forthwith upon the demonstration of certain facts, then an argument can be made that there 
is constitutional compulsion for the courts to adjudicate claims until the agency can do so 
in a satisfactory way. 
What about cases in which an individual does not seek a direct benefit, but is a 
defendant in an agency enforcement proceeding seeking to avoid liability? Normally, in 
such enforcement cases, disabling a hopelessly dysfunctional agency, by constantly striking 
down its enforcement decisions, adequately protects private rights. Thus, there is no need 
for the court to temporarily function as the agency by replacing it. In the ouija board 
hypothetical above, if a court forbids the SEC from bringing an action for a penalty until 
it adopts sensible and lawful factfinding procedures, the defendant is protected. 
It is possible to imagine a case in which an agency so seriously neglects its duties to 
protect the public interest that courts ought to read judicial adjudication of violations into 
the statutory authorization until the agency regains reasonable legitimacy. These cases 
would be situations in which immediate, large-scale harm could result, well before the 
political processes could correct things: one might imagine, agencies which were 
empowered to deal with serious epidemics or with serious problems of national security. 
This Article, however, is not endorsing the view that a court should take over adjudications 
in these circumstances by either augmenting the record made before an agency, or 
completely changing the record by hearing matters originally. In only a limited subset of 
cases isOvertonPark'sfirstexception warranted, given the model of judicial review adopted 
by that case. 
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B. The Second Exception: When Issues that were Not Before the 
Agency Are Raised in a Proceeding to Enforce Non-Adjudicatory Agency 
Action 
As defined under the APA, non-adjudicatory action means only one 
thing: rulemaking.150 Hence this exception deals with a challenge to an 
agency rule by someone against whom it has been enforced in an agency 
proceeding. As with the first exception, this one seerris either completely 
unwarranted or at least overly broad. Overton Park requires review only 
on the informational record which was before the agency at the time of its 
decision. 151 
In a direct challenge to a rule brought by a regulated party, Overton Park 
implies that the rule stands or falls based on the agency's actual reasons for 
promulgation and any support for those reasons found in the record, for 
example, the supporting materials actually considered by the agency.152 
A rule may be unwise, but if an agency has followed the minimally proper 
requirements of section 553, it is a valid rule as long as it was appropriately 
based on statutory authority, on the comments, and on any other materials 
the agency actually considered. 
This is not to say that those injured by a rule are without a remedy when 
facts change or new evidence of earlier conditions calls the rule into 
question. The usual remedy, in such cases, is a petition for a new 
rulemaking in which either a new rule can be made or an existing one can 
be modified or repealed. 153 A denial of such a petition is most likely 
judicially reviewable, 154 and reversible, when clearly arbitrary and 
capricious.155 Moreover, when there has been review of an agency 
decision not to hold a proceeding to repeal or modify a rule, judicial review 
150. The AP A formally defines "adjudication'" as "an agency process for the formulation 
of an order." 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1994). In turn, an "order" is the result of an agency matter 
"other than rule making." /d. § 551(6). Implicitly, then, an action that is not adjudicatory 
is rulemaking. 
151. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
152. /d. at 419-20. 
153. 5 U.S.C. § 553{e) (1994). . 
154. American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see 
also WWHT, 656 F.2d at 817 (indicating that intensity of judicial scrutiny in. review for 
arbitrary and capricious agency action varies from context to context and that review of 
agency's decision not to undertake rulemaking is close to minimal end of spectrum of scruti-
ny). , 
155. · WWHT, 656 F.2d at 818-19 (surveying those few cases in which agency decision 
to decline to undertake rulemaking was struck down). 
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has been "on the record" within the meanmg of Overton Park. 156 Of 
course, it is impossible to have review on the record of a new rulemaking 
proceeding which did not yet occur. The review will be on the record of 
the "proceeding" which did occur-the 553(e) proceeding in which a new 
rulemaking proceeding was proposed and rejected by the agency.157 
It is possible to imagine cases which may call for exceptional proce-
dures. There may even be extraordinary cases, involving changes in 
circumstances or information in which it would be an abuse of discretion 
for an agency not to initiate a proceeding to modify a rule. In such cases, 
it would be an abuse of discretion for an agency not to take immediate 
steps to rescind a rule. One might even argue further that in very clear 
cases, courts should view a rule as having become invalid without agency 
action to repeal it, and excuse non-compliance. 158 There is a temporal 
dimension as well. It might be possible to argue that such a view applies 
only to direct challenges to rules made by regulated persons shortly after 
promulgation, but that de novo review on an augmented record is 
appropriate when a rule is challenged in an enforcement proceeding. In 
most cases, this seems unjustifiable. If one is going to depart from the 
review-on-the-record model, the most propitious time to do so is immedi-
ately on direct review so that the rule's validity is more likely to be settled 
at an early time, rather than to encourage an endless series of cases, each 
claiming that an agency failed to consider some evidence available at the 
time of decision.159 Again there may be a small subset of enforcement 
proceedings in which it may make principled sense to allow challenge to 
a rule on an augmented record. These seem reducible to the exceptional 
circumstances discussed above, which would amount to gross abuse of 
discretion in not suspending a rule based on dramatic new facts or newly 
discovered facts. 160 
156. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
157. American Horse, 812 F.2d at 5 (treating papers submitted in support of petition for 
rulemaking as part of record for purposes of reviewing denial of that petition). 
158. In such cases, it may be consistent with standard administrative procedure to permit 
a regulated person to violate a rule even though (I) the agency followed minimal section 
553 procedures in compiling the record, and (2) on the basis of that record and the agency's 
actual contemporaneous reasons for promulgating it, the rule was neither arbitrary and 
capricious nor in violation of law. 
159. See WAL1ER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISlRATIVE LAW 450 (8th ed. 1986). 
160. To accomplish this result, the court would have to proceed de novo and consider 
evidence bearing on the rule's new illegitimacy because there was no proceeding below-
not even a proceeding to consider whether or not to have a proceeding. 
All of this is speculation, as opposed to the overwhelming reality of the On the 
Record Rule. The Supreme Court has not invalidated a rule based on extra-record evidence 
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Only occasionally have courts looked at post-decision events to help 
them sustain decisions resting on predictions which seemed to have come 
true. In one case, a court suggested, in dicta, that sufficient post-decision 
events might be used to undercut an agency's decision if they showed the 
underlying predictions to be "wholly fi.ctional."161 
In light of the fact that Overton Park's exceptions are not used and in 
light of the fact that, in most circumstances, such exceptions are inconsis-
tent with the Court's own general model of administrative law, this Article 
turns skeptically to claims that the courts have nearly destroyed the On the 
Record Rule by allowing exceptions going beyond those announced m 
Overton Park. 
III. THE ALLEGED DEMISE OF THE OVERTON PARK "ON THE RECORD 
RULE" 
A. Introduction: The Stark and Wald Article 
In 1984, Steven Stark and Sarah Wald published Setting No Records: 
The Failed Attempt to Limit the Record in Review of Administrative 
Action. 162 Their article has been cited in several cases163 and was sub-
stantially excerpted, without criticism, in a fine and formative administra-
tive law casebook. 164 While the real world existence of even the excep-
of dramatic subsequent events. 
I61. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. Even in an instance in which such 
treatment might be appropriate, it is doubtful that the Court would be willing to allow a 
departure from the usual requirements that a rule must be followed unless: (1) subsequent 
events are dramatic enough to deprive a rule of the slim rational basis required by due 
process, (2) it is struck down on the original record, (3) it is repealed, or (4) in unusual 
circumstances where a section 553( e) petition for a new rule has been denied, it is clear that 
any course of action but repeal is arbitrary and capricious. 
162. 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 333 (1984). 
163. Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 n.166 (D.C. Cir. 1989); American Mining 
Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617, 626 (lOth Cir. 1985); Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. 
Madigan, No. NA 90-1 75-C LEXIS 8691 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 1991), rev 'd, 956 F.2d 670, (7th 
Cir.), reh 'gdenied, LEXIS 2650 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 820 (1992). 
164. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 159, at 452-54. As this Article went to press, a new 
edition of the Gellhorn Casebook (PETER L. S1RAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S 
ADMINIS1RATIVE LAW (9th ed. 1995)) was published without inclusion of, or reference to, 
the Stark and Wald article, or for that matter Court of Appeals cases such as Asarco, Inc. 
v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1980), or Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 
1977), which had recognized exceptions to the On the Record Rule not rec6gnized in 
Overton Park, exceptions to determine, for example, whether an agency considered relevant 
factors or to provide a court with the technical background necessary to make an assessment 
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tions identified in Overton Park seems doubtful, Stark and Wald conclude 
that the lower courts have widely ignored the On the Record Rule, riddling 
it with new exceptions. In short, they conclude that the "on the record" 
model, to some significant extent~ is a merely a paper model: 
[A]n examination of the concept of review on the record in the courts surprisingly 
reveals that the doctrine no longer exists in any coherent form, although judges and 
analysts pretend that it is still viable. Faced with the difficulty of defining the 
record in specific cases, courts have developed so many unwritten exceptions to 
the doctrine of record review, that Industrious advocates now can introduce any 
evidence they choose in cases reviewing informal administrative action. 165 
Stark and Wald cast their conclusion in the form of a list of developing 
exceptions to review on the record ranging far beyond the two exceptions 
recognized in Overton Park. The exceptional situations they identify apply 
to the following situations: (A) "when agency action is not adequately 
explained in the record before the court"; (B) "when the agency failed to 
consider factors which are relevant to its final decision"; (C) "when an 
agency considered evidence which it failed to include in the record"; (D) 
"when a case is so complex that a court needs more evidence to enable it 
to understand the issues clearly"; (E) "in cases where evidence arising after 
the agency action shows whether the decision was correct or not"; (F) "in 
cases where agencies are sued for a failure to take action"; (G) "in cases 
arising under the National Environmental Policy Act"; and (H) "in cases 
where relief is at issue, especially at the preliminary injunction stage"}66 
It.is important to stress one point. Anyone who argues that lower federal 
courts have ignored a clear Supreme Court doctrinal pronouncement, 
forcefully reiterated by the Court within two years of its original state-
ment, 167 needs at least some relatively clear and robust lower court 
decisions to support the claim. Claims made in 1984 for the existence of 
these categories rest either on assertions supported by slender authority or 
on mistaken notions about the meaning of Overton Park's On the Record 
Rule, particularly as to the notion of "record" incorporated in it. Also, the 
cases decided since that article was published largely fail to support claims 
that the Rule has eroded. 168 
of rationality of an agency decision. 
165. Stark & Wald, supra note 36, at 335-36. 
166. /d. at 344-45. These propositions are labeled exceptions I to 8 by Stark and Wald. 
167. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) {"The focal point for judicial review 
should be the administrative record already in existence:'). 
168. In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorian, 470 U.S. 729, 743-744 (1985), the Court 
indicated that review of agency action is to be on the record of the agency proceeding 
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Two of the claimed exceptions have strong surface appeal and seem to 
owe their existence to contradictions inherent in administrative law-indeed 
to contradictions in Overton Park itself. These do find some limited in the 
case law, often in dicta. They are extremely difficult to harmonize with the 
Supreme Court's general scheme for judicial review of Informal administra-
tive action. Parts IIIB and IV of this Article deal with the categories one 
by one, in each examining evidence available in 1984 and then develop-
ments since that time. 
B. Evidence for and Discussion of Exceptions .from 1971 to Present 
In the case of several of their proposed exceptions, Stark and Wald 
correctly conclude that lower federal courts have held evidentiary hearings. 
As to several such exceptions, however, Stark and Wald are wrong in 
concluding that this practice is inconsistent with the On the Record Rule as 
prescribed in Overton Park. Characterizing practices consistent with 
Overton Park as departures helps make a case that the On the Record Rule 
is crumbling, possibly from general unworkability. A rule which the lower 
courts have poked full of holes is likely to be a rule whose basic vision is 
uns.ound. Below, the Article deals separately with each of the Stark and 
Wald exceptions. 
·1. When an Agency Considered Evidence that It Failed to Include in 
the Record169 
This exception to the On the Record Rule turns out to be self-contradic-
tory. Under Overton Park, the record in an informal proceeding includes 
everything that an agency considered in reaching its decision, as well as 
anything that it was required to consider, such as comments in rulemaking 
proceedings. 170 Hence, nothing that was considered by an agency can be 
considered outside of the "record" in an Overton Park sense. It may be 
true that what the agency presents as the record is not actually comprehen-
sive.171 When a court allows augmentation of the record, submitted by 
"except in rare circumstances." The last proviso seems more plausibly to refer to Overton 
Park's original exceptions than to endorse the subsequent ones described by Stark and Wald. 
169. This is the third on the Stark and Wald list of exceptions. Stark and Wald, supra 
note 36, at 347-48. 
170. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (stating that "[r]eview is to be based on the full 
administrative record that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision"); 
Camp, 411 U.S. at 142 ("[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative 
record already in existence.") . 
. '171. See cases cited infra notes 175-76. 
HeinOnline -- 10 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 222 1996
222 THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:179 
an agency, to include material actually considered, but not initially 
presented, to the reviewing court by the agency, it is attempting to ensure 
review on the record in the Overton Park sense. In other words, it is 
following Overton Park's dictates. 
Cases decided post-Stark and Wald make clear that the record in an 
Overton Park sense is what was before the agency at the time of its 
decision and not simply what the agency chooses to proffer as supporting 
its decision. 172 One particularly clear statement is that of the D.C. Circuit 
in a case decided shortly after the publication of the Stark and Wald article: 
If a court is to review an agency's action fairly, it should have before it neither 
more nor less information than did the agency when it made its decision. The 
Supreme Court's formulation in Overton Park cautions against both under- and 
over-inclusiveness in the administrative record before the reviewing court. 
"[R]eview is to be based on the full administrative record before the Secretary at 
the time he made his decision." [citing Overton Park] To review less than the full 
administrative record might allow a party to withhold evidence unfavorable to its 
case .... 173 
Since then, when courts clearly address the issue, they generally 
recognize that materials before the agency at the time of decision are not 
extra-record materials and that the "record submitted by the agency may be 
supplemented on judicial review to reflect the full record in the Overton 
Park sense."174 
I72. !d. 
173. Walter 0. Boswell Memorial Hasp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788 (D.C. Cir. I984). 
This case was decided in the same year the Stark and Wald article was published; however, 
it was not decided until November, I 984. Most likely, the case was decided too late in the 
year to have been available to those authors. 
I 74. In Thompson v. United States Dep't of Labor, 885 F.2d 55 I, 555 (9th Cir. I 989), 
the Ninth Circuit proposed: "The whole administrative record, however, 'is not necessarily 
those documents that the agency has compiled and submitted as "the" administrative record 
. . . . The "whole" administrative record ... consists of all documents and materials 
directly or indirectlyconsidered by agency decision-makers and includes evidence contrary 
to the agency's position."' !d. (citations omitted) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. United States 
Dep't of Energy, 9I F.R.D. 26, 32 (N.D. Tex. I98I). See also Citizens for Envtl. Quality 
v. United States, 73 I F. Supp. 970, 982 (D. Colo. I 989) (finding that court may 
"supplement" record submitted by agency to reflect "whole record"); National Wildlife 
Fed'n v. Burford, 677 F. Supp. I445, 1457 (D. Mont. I985) ("An agency may not submit 
an administrative record to the court which contains only documents favoring the agency's 
decision and omits documents present in the agency's file which bear upon matters before 
the court."). 
Some opinions do continue to describe discovery of material not supplied. by the 
agency but before it at the time of the decision as an extra-record inquiry, but none o,qhem 
suggests a belief that such an inquiry is an exception to Overton Park's ··on the Record 
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2. When Agency Action Is Not Adequately Explained in the Record 
Before the Court-s 
223 
This exception, as well, rests on a misunderstanding. Stark and Wald 
cite two cases, Overton Park itself and a decision of a lower federal court 
which did not permit the hearing of extra record evidence. 176 The lower 
federal court case apparently is cited to reiterate Overton Park's statements 
that, if an agency fails to explain its decision adequately, a reviewing court 
can require testimony of administrative officials as to the reasons for 
reaching the decision. 177 
One could view the explanation as part of the record, and in an expanded 
sense of the word it is. However, it is not what the Overton Park Court 
had in mind when it announced its requirement of review on the record that 
was before the agency. The Court separated the record from the explana-
tion, when it stressed that the explanation was to be one revealing the 
agency's actual reasoning and that it must be supported by a separate set 
of materials-the record before the agency. 178 In short, the record is an 
evidentiary record. The explanation is different: it attempts to justify the 
Rule." In these cases, the court seems to be using the word "record" in a secondary non-
Overton Park sense to mean what the agency provides to the court. Animal Defense 
Counsel v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988). Hodel was later clarified by 
Thompson, 885 F.2d at 555. One Supreme Court majority opinion describes the record 
Overton Park refers to as "the record the agency presents to the court." Florida Power & 
Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985). In that case, however, there is no 
indication that the Court had in mind a situation in which such a record did not reflect the 
full record. These words seem more a loose and inaccurate paraphrase of OvertonParkthan 
a readjustment of its notion of record regarding a situation not before the court. 
175. This is the first exception on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, supra note 
36, at 344-46. 
176. Madison County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 622 F.2d 
393 (8th Cir. 1980). 
177. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
178. /d. at 419-20 (finding "post hoc rationalization" by agency of its previous 
inadequate reasoning and citing Chenery, which required agency decision to be justified by 
its actual reasons at time of its decision). The Court's solution was either for the agency 
to prepare a contemporaneous explanation of its reasoning or to submit to examination in 
court as to the reasoning under which it acted. /d. The Court's rejection of "post hoc 
rationalizations" makes this especially clear. !d. The Court, however, does realize that 
giving the agency an opportunity to reconstruct its reasoning in court has its post hoc perils, 
presumably because such reconstruction may be influenced by post-decision events in ways 
diffi-cult' to -winnow out. /d. 
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agency decision by rationally connecting the evidentiary record with 
applicable law and policy. 
If an agency's explanation of its decision is inadequate because it is 
insufficiently detailed, Overton Park says that the agency is permitted to 
more fully explain why it reached its decision on the evidentiary record 
before it. 179 The latter deficiency, however, does not permit a trial court 
to hear evidence that goes beyond the evidence the agency had before it 
when reaching its decision. 180 The cases dealing with explanations have 
nothing to do with augmenting the factual record the agency had before it 
when it reasoned its conclusion. These cases turn, instead, on whether the 
explanation is both internally logical, sufficiently detailed, and supported 
by material in the record.. In the narrower sense, the explanation must 
encompass the factual material considered by the agency. 
Once this "exception" is understood to permit nothing more than a 
court's consideration of "evidence" of an agency's actual reasons for a 
decision (as opposed to new evidence about the world external to the 
agency's decision process), it is no exception at all .. It is not an alteration 
to, but a reiteration of, the Overton Park doctrine. 
3. In Cases Where Agencies Are Sued for a Failure to Take Action181 
If there has been no proceeding-no rulemaking or adjudication-there 
can be no record of such non-existent proceeding on which to base review. 
To the extent, however, that an agency's refusal to hold such a proceeding 
is reviewable, there is a record on which the agency based its decision not 
to commence such a proceeding. Analogously to Overton Park, the record 
is everything the agency actually considered or was required to consider in 
deciding not to start an adjudication or rulemaking. 182 
179. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. 
180. In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973), the Court stated: 
The proceeding in the District Court was obviously not brought to enforce the 
Comptroller's decision, and the only deficiency suggested in agency action or 
proceedings is that the Comptroller inadequately explained his decision. As 
Overton Park demonstrates, however, that failure, if it occurred in this case, is not 
a deficiency in factfinding procedures such as to warrant the de novo hearing 
ordered in this case .... 
!d. at 142. 
181. This is the sixth exception on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, supra note 
36, at 350-51. 
182. See supra note 157 (describing record for review of agency refusal to grant 
rulemaking petition). 
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Despite Heckler v. Chaney's183 holding that most agency decisions not 
to bring enforcement proceedings are not judi·cially reviewable, refusals to 
institute rulemaking proceedings, including those to repeal or amend a rule, 
seem to continue to be subject to judicial review. 184 Presumably, an 
extremely weak version of arbitrary and capricious review applies. 185 
This most likely means that the agency must consider a petition requesting 
agency action. and supporting materials, but that only an outrageously bad 
decision will be overturned. The agency may exercise less care and the 
reviewing court should be more forgiving of a decision undercut by such 
a record. 
No one, least of all any of the Justices who decided Overton Park, would 
have been surprised that, if judicial review were to occur in such cases, the 
reviewing court's scrutiny would not be confined to the reco:rd of a 
proceeding that did not exist. As with Overton Park, the relevant record 
is made up of the materials underlying the actual decision challenged, or, 
as in this case, the materials supporting the agency decision not to hold a 
proceeding. 186 · 
4. Suits Seeking Preliminary Relief8-
Stark and Wald assert that courts allow extra-record evidence. in cases in 
which injunctive relief is sought against agency action. One of the two 
cases they cite to in their article looks at prior agency opinions to determine 
consistency, 188 which is not an excursion into factual material not before 
the agency at the time it reached its decision. The other cited case involves 
a petition for preliminary equitable relief 189 
Certainly, when parties seek a temporary restraining order or a temporary 
injunction against agency action, for example, against enforcement of a rule 
alleged to be arbitrary and capricious, courts will need to develop a record 
183. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). 
184. American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d I, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
185. WHHT, 656 F.2d at 817-18. 
186. See supra note 157 (discussing record for review of denials to grant petition for 
rulemaking). · 
187. This is the eighth exception, "H", on the Stark and Wa\d list. Stark and Wald, 
supra note 36, at 353-54. 
188. Stark and Wald, supra note 36, at 354 n.4 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United 
States Dep't of Energy, 449 F. Supp. 760 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Standard Oil Co. 
v. United States Dep't of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029 (Temp. ·Emer. Ct. App. 1978)). 
189, ·.GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 404 F. Supp. 352 (D. Del. 
1975). 
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to answer factual questions made relevant by the judicially created, 
equitable standards for granting such relief. One such question is the 
probable magnitude of needless harm, if any, suffered, pendente lite, by a 
challenger, on the assumption arguendo that the agency's rule or order 
proves invalid. To resolve this issue, the District Court may need all sorts 
of evidence about the plaintiffs circumstances and about the agency 
actions' effect on him during this limited period. This sort of evidence will 
never have been fully developed in the agency record. The agency's 
weighing of costs and benefits to regulated parties is likely to be more 
general in nature and certainly will not have focused on a period defined 
by pendency of litigation. Evidence of harm pendente lite, however, is not 
used to challenge the substance of the agency decision, but rather to resolve 
a preliminary issue unique to the lawsuit. 
As to the harm to the public if a rule or order is suspended pending 
review, the agency record will not always provide an answer. If the court 
temporarily suspends a valid rule or order, it may need to determine how 
much harm a suspension will impose on the public. This inquiry overlaps 
the inquiry involved in reviewing the agency's decision, but it seeks to 
determine probable harm, not over the life of the rule or order, but for the 
much shorter period defined by the pendancy of the litigation. It is, 
therefore, beyond the scope of the On the Record Rule and, consequently, 
is not an exception to it. 
Finally, in assessing another factor relevant to preliminary relief--the 
probability of success on the merits-the court should assess the probable 
validity of the rule the same way it would on full consideration. This 
means a cursory look at the record in the Overton Park sense. If the court 
were to look at extra-record evidence to assess this factor, then it would 
recognize a true exception. Courts do not seem to do this. A court might 
find such an extra-record inquiry especially compelling if immediate relief 
is needed and the administrative record has not yet been assembled. Even 
if a court were to look at extra-record evidence for this purpose, with a 
commitment to decide the ultimate merits on the record once assembled, it 
seems fair to describe what the court has done as less than extra-record 
review. Such a court would have made the best guess it could on materials 
available to it. The court will not have completely invalidated agency 
action based on such extra-record material, although it may have suspended 
it temporarily. 
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5. Suits Under NEPA 190 
Stark and Wald view cases under the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPAY91 as falling within a blanket exception to the On the Record 
Rule.192 It is true that a great many of the cases allowing extra-record 
evidence are NEPA cases.193 This view, if correct, can best be explained 
on the ground that NEPA is inconsistent with the APA's requirements as 
described in Overton Park and, therefore~ NEPA overrides those require-
ments.194 On this view, the values underlying NEPA, for example, 
requiring that those undertaking projects with significant impact on the 
environment consider the various environmental costs of those impacts, 
require that a court compare what an agency actually considered with what 
it could have considered. 195 
Certainly, one might attempt to extend this view beyond NEPA, arguing 
that courts, in determining the arbitrariness and capriciousness of agency 
action in general, must determine whether the agency considered relevant 
factors. The failure of an agency to do so could be determined only by 
comparing what is in an administrative record with what is not. From a 
normative perspective, this Article is sympathetic to both this view and the 
more general exception that Stark and Wald and a number of courts have 
recognized to accommodate it. From a descriptive point of view, however, 
the Supreme Court's general model for arbitrary and capricious review is 
more constraining than the model for review permitted under NEPA. 
190. This is the seventh exception on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, supra 
note 36, at 351-53. 
191. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370b (1994). 
192. See French, supra note 67, at 945-76 (discussing On the Record Rule in NEPA 
cases). 
193. See, for example, cases discussed in French, supra note 67, at 948-49. 
194. French, supra note 67, at 989-90, seems to take this view, as do some of the cases. 
See, e.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973) (tying permissi-
bility of excursions beyond administrative record in NEPA cases to specific statutory intent 
and not to more general exception for all cases). Some courts, however, do allow extra-
record evidence in NEPA cases on more generally applicable exceptions, such as to 
determine whether an agency has considered relevant factors, or to allow a court background 
for assessing a technically complex case. French, supra note 67, at 951-52. These 
exceptions are listed separately by Stark and Wald and addressed at length in the next PART 
IV. 
195. French, supra note 67, at 989-90. 
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6. In Cases Where Evidence Arising After the Agency Action Shows 
Whether the Decision Was Correct or Nof96 
This alleged exception is so flatly at odds with Overton Park that, if it 
exists, it renders the On the Record Rule meaningless. The issue is either 
whether an agency· decision was correct when issued, or whether it would 
be correct now in light of the new information. Because Overton Park 
clearly chose the historical approach over one which would require judicial 
reassessment of a decision based on new evidence, there is almost no 
caselaw supporting this exception. 
Great harm may be inflicted by a decision which turns out to be wrong, 
although it was reasonable when rendered. This problem is likely to be 
most acute in rulemaking. There are compelling reasons, however, why 
courts are not given revisory power. First, where a rule or a coercive order 
in an adjudication proves wrong and harmful, after all the factors are 
balanced, an agency can be expected to behave responsibly. A motion to 
reopen an adjudication, a petition to reconsider a failure to bring an 
enforcement proceeding, and a petition to repeal or amend a rule are 
appropriate ways to deal with new evidence under an Overton Park model. 
At least in the case of agency failure to make or amend a rule, courts are 
likely available to grant relief in unconscionable cases. 
Stark and Wald cite two cases for this exception for post-decision 
developments. 197 Cases decided since i 984 clearly state that post-decision 
information is not to be used to undercut an agency's decision. 198 
196. This is the fifth exception on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, supra note 
36, at 349-50. 
197. Amoco Oil v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that new data 
supplied by EPA helped court reach conclusion that EPA's original predictions had rational 
basis); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1034 (lOth Cir. 1976) (stating 
same as above), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). One might view these cases as not 
suggesting that post decisional studies could be admitted to undercut an agency's predictions, 
but rather as simply allowing a court in a close case to conclude that agency predictions 
were not unreasonable. But see Association ofPac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-12 
(9th Cir. 1980) ("If the post decisional studies showed that the Agency proceeded upon 
assumptions that were entirely fictional or utterly without scientific support, then 
post-decisional data might be utilized by the party challenging the regulation."). 
198. Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1296 (9th Cir. 1990); Rutherford v. United 
States, 806 F.2d 1455, 1461 {lOth Cir. 1986). But see Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 
590 F. Supp. 1467, 1475 (D. Mass. 1984) (allowing supplementation of record to show 
factors agency should have considered, but did not). , • · 
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7. The Last Two Exceptions 
The last two exceptions asserted by Stark and Wald apply to the 
following situations: "When the agency failed to consider factors which are 
relevant to its final decision, and when a case is so complex that a court 
needs more evidence to enable it to understand the issues clearly."199 A 
substantial number of courts have found these exceptions necessary-while 
arguably inconsistent with Overton Park's On the Record Rule-to comply 
sufficiently with other requirements of that case, including the requirement 
that the court conduct a "thorough, probing, in-depth review." This ensures 
that a court has considered all the relevant factors. 
If an agency has not considered a factor that it should have considered, 
how can that possibly appear in the administrative record, defined by 
Overton Park as the set of materials considered by the agency? How could 
the Overton Park Court expect that probing review could occur if it were 
confined to a record, when no record can contain all of the information to 
test whether it rationally supports a decision? The next section of this 
Article deals with these questions in detail. 
lV. THE "ON THE RECORD RULE" AND ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
RATIONALITY ANALYSIS 
·A. The Exceptions for Material Bewing on Relevant Factor Analysis 
and Technical Background Material 
One would imagine that the thirteen years under Overton Park's "hard 
look" regime would have amply exposed the tensions between requirements 
for intense review and requirements that such ·review be limited to the 
record before the agency. Despite this, Stark and Wald were able to offer 
relatively few cases in which the pressures for careful review resulted in 
recognition of new exceptions to the On the Record Rule.200 Stark and 
Wald claimed that, among other exceptions created by lower federal courts 
to destroy "any coherent form" of the On the Record Rule, are the 
199. These are exceptions "B" and "D" on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, 
supra note 36, at 346-47, 348-49. 
200. For examples of the relevant factors exception, Stark and Wald cite: Asarco, Inc. 
v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1980); Hyatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 
457,467 (D. Kan. 1978), afl'd, 602 F.2d 929 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1073 
(1980); and Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, No. 83-0506, slip op. (D. Mass. Apr. 25, 
1984). Stark and Wald, supra note 36, at 346-47. 
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exceptions dealing with the following situations: "When the agency failed 
to consider factors which are relevant to its final decision, and when a case 
is so complex that a court needs more evidence to enable it to understand 
the issues clearly."201 
For both the period antedating and that following the Stark and Wald 
article, it is extremely difficult to determine the number of cases in which 
a court has either acted on, or at least recognized in dicta, either of these 
exceptions to the On the Record Rule. In many cases where material is 
added to the physical record in court, and either or both of these exceptions 
are cited, courts may have simply allowed an agency to explain its decision, 
as permitted by Overton Park, without adducing factual material which was 
not before the agency at the time it decided. In many cases, it is especially 
difficult to separate dicta from the holding. Sometimes it is not clear from 
the opinions whether an "exception," as understood by a particular court is 
truly an exception, inconsistent with the On the Record Rule.202 
There are, however, some courts which do go beyond the On the Record 
Rule in order to perform "relevant factor analysis" as they understand 
it.203 One clear example of a case recognizing a true "relevant factors" 
exception is Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Clark.204 
In that case, the court allowed production of affidavits of experts and other 
material not before the agency at the time of its decision, so that it could 
determine whether the agency had performed an adequate analysis of 
relevant factors: 
It will often be impossible, especially when highly technical matters are 
involved, for the court to determine whether the agency took into consideration all 
relevant factors unless it looks outside the record to determine what matters the 
agency should have considered but did not. The court cannot adequately discharge 
its duty to engage in a "substantial inquiry'' if it is required to take the agency's 
word that it considered all relevant matters. In the instant case, it is arguable that 
201. These are exceptions "B" and "D" on the Stark and Wald list. Stark and Wald, 
supra note 36, at 346-47, 348-49. 
202. See, e.g., AT&T Information Systems, Inc. v. General Services Admin., 810 F.2d 
1233, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987): "Although the record may be supplementep to provide, for 
example, background information or evidence of whether all relevant factors were examined 
by an agency ... we have made clear that the new material should be merely explanatory 
of the original record." What does '·explanatory of the original record" mean?: (I) 
explanatory of its true contents, or (2) explanatory of how the agency rationalized its 
decision based on the record. Neither such explanation would be a true exception, 
inconsistent with Overton Park's On the Record Rule. 
203. See infra notes 204-07 and accompanying text. 
204. 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1474-75 & n.5 (D. Mass. 1984), aff'dsub nom., Conservation 
Law Found. v. Secretary of Interior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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the Park Service failed to consider adequately whether extensive ORV use of the 
Seashore, even if ecologically compatible, was an "appropriate public use" as 
mandated by the Seashore Act. Therefore, the court will admit documentary 
evidence that bears on this issue, including professional articles, expert affidavits, 
and .figures on Cape Cod beach visitation.205 
231 
There are other cases which seem to hold in favor of a true exception for 
relevant factors purposes206 and s_till others which may endorse such an 
exception in dicta.207 
205. /d. at 1475 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
206. Listed below are cases in which the court's opinion leaves some reason to believe 
that evidence was admitted under a relevant factors exception to Overton Park's On the 
Record Rule. Many cases in this list, however, may be explained on other grounds. For 
example, they may tum on the availability of another exception, such as NEPA's arguably 
more generous view of the appropriate record for review. These cases include the following: 
Love v. Thomas, 838 F.2d I 059 (9th Cir. 1988) (specifically approving augmentation under 
relevant factor exception), affg in part and rev 'gin part on other grounds, 668 F. Supp. 
1443, 1448-51 (D. Or. 1987) (allowing augmentation of record to evaluate whether agency 
took into account all relevant factors, looked at data readily available to, but not considered 
by agency, and described what agency would have found if agency had conducted a minimal 
investigation); Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347, 357 (8th Cir. 
1984) (upholding district court's supplementation of record, among other reasons, to 
determine whether all relevant factors were considered), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1158 (1985); 
Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 1980) (asserting that district court 
"went too far in consideration of evidence outside the administrative record," but finding 
extra record material admissible); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 
1474-75 & n.5 (D. Mass. 1984) (allowing augmentation of record to show factors agency 
should have considered but did not, including affidavits from professional article experts and 
figures on Cape Cod beach visitation), affd sub nom., Conservation Law Found. v. 
Secretary of Interior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F. Supp. 74, 84 
n.l2, 86 n.l7 (D. Mass. 1982) (finding it necessary to go beyond record to consider material 
bearing on whether agency sufficiently considered all relevant factors); Hiatt Grain & Feed, 
Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 467 (D. Kan. 1978), a.ff'd, 602 F.2d 929 (lOth Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). 
207. Sierra Club v. United States Dep't ofTransp., 695 F. Supp. 460, 463-64 (N.D. Cal. 
1988) (recognizing relevant factor exception in dicta while using background information 
exception), rev'd on other grounds, 948 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1991); AT&T Information 
Systems v. GSA, 810 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing, in dicta, exception 
to enable court to determine whether agency considered all relevant factors-but not using 
such exception); Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 285-86 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (recognizing exception to exclusivity of administrative record where necessary to 
determine if agency considered relevant factors); American Legion v. Derwinski, 827 F. 
Supp. 805, 811-12 (D.D.C. 1993) (recognizing relevant factor exception in dicta, but 
admitting extra-record material as explanation of decision), a.ff'd, 54 F.3d 789, 811 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995), petition/or cert.filed, (Aug. II, 1995); Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v.· 
Thompson, 811 F. Supp. 635, 642 n.4 (D. Utah 1993) (reviewing exceptions to On the 
Record Rule, including information relevant to whether agency failed to consider"relevant 
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Likewise the "technical background exception" is not always mistakenly 
invoked to justify nothing more than a court's assembling the record as 
required by Overton Park. Sometimes new material, not considered by the 
agency, is considered on judicial review of the agency's decision.208 One 
clear example is Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corpora-
tion.209 Although, in that ca~e, some evidence was admitted simply to 
complete the record in the Overton Park sense, other information, not 
considered by the agency, was admitted to provide the court with a feel for 
the issues: 
The district court's admission of explanatory evidence served to help the court 
understand the complex nature of petroleum geology. It also served the related 
and equally important ·purpose of educating the court as to the kinds of scientific, 
technical, and economic data that are relevant to a legally correct [agency] 
determination. 210 
There are other cases which seem to hold that courts may go beyond the 
record to provide a court with background information due to the "highly 
evidence," but not allowing supplementation); Saint James Hosp. v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 
757,762 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (discussing plaintiff's arguments and applicable law which argues 
for admission of litigation affidavits based inter alia on need to determine consideration of 
relevant factors, but refusing to admit them because record was sufficient to decide case), 
aff'd, 760 F.2d 1460 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985); Abington Memorial 
Hosp. v. Heckler, 576 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 750 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985) (acknowledging Asarcoexceptions for background 
information or information bearing on consideration of relevant factors, but refusing to 
consider plaintiff's affidavit which went to merits of agency's decision); No Oilport! v. 
Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 345-37 (W .D. Wash. 1981) (recognizing relevant factors exception 
but actually justifying admission based on special nature ofNEPA and on need for agency 
to explain its decision as in Overton Park; allowing affidavits to establish adequacy of 
Environmental Impact Statement and to assist in explication of agency's decision in NEPA 
case). 
208. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text. 
209. 734 F.2d 347, 357-60 (8th Cir. 1984). 
210. /d. 
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technical nature of the subject matter,"211 and others which seem to 
endorse such a true exception in dicta. 212 
211. Likewise, some cases possibly go beyond the record due to the "highly technical 
nature of the subject matter." Love v. Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347, 1356 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(specifically approving augmentation under technical background information exception), 
afl'ginpartandrev'ginparton other grounds, 668 F. Supp. 1443, 1448-51 (D. Or. 1987) 
(allowing augmentation of record in order, among other reasons, to provide technical 
background necessary to evaluate record); Norwich Eaton Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Bowen, 
808 F.2d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1987) (apparently approving district court's consideration of 
evidence outside administrative record order to determine whether administrative record was 
adequate, citing need to assess consideration of relevant factors in highly technical case; 
arguably dicta because court finds that district court did not use extra-record evidence it 
admitted imd hence any error would have been non-prejudicial}, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 
(1987); Arkla Exploration Co. v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 734 F.2d 347, 357 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding district court's supplementation of record to explain record, among other reasons, 
to explain complex nature of petroleum geology, to educate court as to kinds of scientific, 
technical, and economic data which were relevant to decision, and ultimately to determine 
whether all relevant factors were considered, but not to substitute court's judgment on 
merits), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); Association ofPac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 
794, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980) (opinion by Anthony Kennedy, C.J.) (allowing direct court of 
appeals review of EPA decision, admitting into evidence studies done after agency decision 
as illuminating original decision); Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't ofTransp., 695 F. Supp. 460, 
463-64 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (considering plaintiff's declarations outside record for purposes of 
background information, but not on merits), rev 'don other grounds, 948 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 
1991); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1474-75 & n.5 (D. Mass. 
1984), afl'd sub nom, Conservation Law Found. v. Secretary oflnterior, 864 F.2d 954 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (allowing augmentation of record to provide technical clarification); MGPC, Inc. 
v. Duncan, 581 F. Supp. 1047, 1059 (D. Wyo. 1984) (allowing introduction of plaintiff's 
affidavits and endorsing extra-record review for purposes of (1) aiding court in under-
standing issues, (2) giving court a background with which to better understand record, and 
(3) helping court to determine adequacy of record), rev 'don other grounds, 763 F.2d 422 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied sub nom., MGPC, Inc. v. United States Dep't of 
Energy, 474 U.S. 823 (1985); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F. Supp. 457, 467 
(D. Kan. 1976), ajJ'd, 602 F.2d 929 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1073 (1980). 
212. Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 1127, 
1137-38 (lOth Cir. 1991) (discussing exceptions to On the Record Rule, but limiting review 
to record which was adequate to allow effective review); Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Castle, 657 F.2d 275, 285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing exception to exclusivity of 
administrative record where necessary to provide technical background necessary to 
understand agency's decision); American Legion v. Derwinski, 827 F. Supp. 805, 811-12 
(D.D.C. 1993) (recognizing technical background exception in dicta but apparently admitting 
.material only to explain what actually occurred in agency below), ajJ'd, 54 F.3d 789, (D.C. 
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, American Legion v. Brown, 116 S. Ct. 697 ( 1996); Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Thompson, 811 F. Supp. 638, 642 n.4 (D. Utah 1993) (reviewing 
exceptions to On the' Record Rule, to include material which explains "technical information 
in the record," but not allowing supplementation); Abington MemorialHosp. v. Heckler, 576 
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What is convincing about Stark and Wald's thesis is that the record of 
an administrative proceeding cannot be the only material that a court 
considers when it reviews an agency decision for basic rationality under the 
arbitrary and capricious test. By analogy to Goedel's theorem, it seems that 
no system, including an administrative record, can determine its own 
validity.213 The validity of any system must be independently defined by 
another system whose own validity is either appraised in terms of yet 
another such system or is a postulate, or, for example, taken on faith. 
The requirement that the government act rationally is one such postulate 
of our legal system, although the courts' vigor in enforcing it varies from 
context to context.214 When action by the legislature is measured against 
constitutional (substantive due process and equal protection) requirements 
of rationality, the courts generously presume that such requirements have 
been satisfied.215 The current interpretation of the non-constitutional 
arbitrary and capricious standard reflects a judgment that agencies should 
be held to a higher standard than the legislature itself.216 
At a minimum, a judge must apply techniques of rationality analysis to 
the material in the record. Some of these, such as ordinary logic and 
mathematics, are likely to be seen in precisely the same way by all judges. 
For example, all would concede the irrationality of an agency's action 
based on a huge mistake in mathematical multiplication or of its reasoning 
F. Supp. 1081, 1087 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (acknowledging Asarcoexceptions for background 
information or information bearing on consideration of relevant factors, but refusing to 
consider plaintiff's affidavit which goes to merits of agency's decision), aff'd, 750 F.2d 242 
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 ·u.s. 863 (1985); Saint James Hasp. v. Heckler, 579 F. 
Supp. 757, 762 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (discussing plaintiff's arguments and applicable l~w which 
argues for admission oflitigation affidavits to clarify original information before agency, but 
refusing to admit them because record was sufficient to decide case), afl'd, 760 F.2d 1460 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985); No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 345-
37 (W.D. Wash. 1981) (recognizing technical background information exception but actually 
justifying admission based on special nature ofNEPA and on need for agency to explain its 
decision as required by Overton Park). 
213. DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, GOEDEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 
(1988). 
214. JOHN E. NOWAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 387-93 (1995) 
(summarizing rational basis due process and equal protection scrutiny since 1937 and 
indicating that, except in special cases such as those involving suspect classes or fundamental 
rights, the constitutional requirements of minimum rationality are easily satisfied). 
215. !d.; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Williamson v. 
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 
(1938). 
216. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9 
(1983). 
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"if x then y; x but not y." They might disagree as to the appropriate use 
of game theory, 217 probability theory/18 or the psychology of bias219 
in decisionmaking. Still, all of these theories are relevant in analyzing the 
rationality of an agency decision and all are external to the record. These 
techniques, particularly their common sense core, are part of the analytical 
reasoning that each judge may bring to the record. It is, however, 
implausible to assume that arbitrary and capricious relevant factor analysis 
is limited to these sorts of considerations. Precisely because they 
necessarily constitute the mind of the analyst, the use of techniques of 
rationality in judicial review are so fundamental as to be assumed 
compatible with the On the Record Rule, without consciousness of that 
assumption. 
The more difficult question is when material about specific states of the 
world can be considered by reviewing judges, even though such material 
was not in the administrative record (was not considered by the agency in 
reaching its decision). Stark and Wald/20 a few lower court holdings221 
and much dicta222 all suggest that such material is allowed (1) to demon-
strate the existence of relevant factors that the agency did not consider, or 
(2) to provide technical background against which the rationality of the 
agency's decision can be assessed. 
1. Relevant Factors 
For a variety of reasons, as Stark and Wald and many cases suggest, the 
regime of Overton Park does not contemplate that the need to pursue 
relevant factor analysis can trump the On the Record Rule. A principal 
reason is the clarity of the Rule as articulated in Overton Park and the 
narrowness of the exceptions explicitly recognized; 
This conclusion seems particularly potent in light of the Supreme Court's 
current view of informal proceedings defined precisely as those involving 
217. For a general discussion of this subject, see THOMAS c. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY 
OF CONFLICT (1981); see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND TilE LAW 
(1994). 
218. LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (1st ed. 1954). 
219. For a general discussion of this subject, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND 
HEURISTICS (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
220. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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tightly bounded rationality, rather than a more extensive search for the right 
answer.223 
An administrative decision is reversible on procedural grounds if the 
record was not compiled by giving interested parties the minimum notice 
and input required by the APA.224 Allowing a court to take evidence to 
consider the existence of possible relevant factors not developed in the 
record and not so well known and clearly relevant as to be judicially 
noticeable seems a violation of Overton Park's requirement that administra-
tive action be sustained or struck down on the record of information 
actually before the agency at the time of its decision.225 This seems an 
especially forceful conclusion when combined with Vermont Yankee's226 
vision of informal proceedings as minimalist, or not going beyond the 
limited requirements imposed by the APA.227 Particularly significant are 
Vermont Yankee's views of appropriate agency procedure in defining 
appropriate judicial review of informal agency action. Specifically Vermont 
Yankee's view that, on judicial review of informal agency action, the 
adequacy of the agency record to support its decision should not be judged 
by comparing that record with the court's guess about the sort of record 
which would have been generated by procedures more intensive than those 
required for informal rulemaking: 
The court below uncritically assumed that additional procedures will automatically 
result in a more adequate record because it will give interested parties more of an 
opportunity to participate in and contribute to the proceedings. But informal 
rulemaking need not be based solely on the transcript of a hearing held before an 
agency. Indeed, the agency need not even hold a formal hearing. Thus, the 
adequacy of the record in this type of proceeding is not correlated directly to the 
type of procedural devices employed, but rather turns on whether the agency has 
followed the statutory mandate of the Administrative Procedure Act or other 
relevant statutes. If the agency is compelled to support the rule which it ultimately 
adopts with the type of record produced only after a full adjudicatory hearing, it 
simply will have no choice but to conduct a full adjudicatory hearing prior to 
promulgating every rule. In sum, this sort of unwarranted judicial examination of 
223. If informality has any legitimate province at all it involves those decisions in which 
the expense of requiring the agency to look closely at all arguably relevant material is not 
worth the expense of doing so, based on the presumed trustworthiness of the agency in light 
of what is at stake. 
224. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1994). 
225. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). 
226. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 546-48 (1978). 
227. !d. 
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perceived procedural shortcomings of a rulemaking proceeding can do nothing but 
seriously interfere with that process prescribed by Congress.228 
237 
Additionally, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v. LTV Corp./29 is indica-
tive of the Court's view of the degree of freedom that agencies possess in 
deciding some matters without help in developing the information. In that 
case~ the Court noted that there is no APA requirement permitting notice 
of the issues or a right to participate in informal adjudications.230 To 
permit de novo review to determine if an agency has considered relevant 
factors guts both U!rmont Yankee and Pension Benefits, by permitting an 
agency to adopt informal procedures, but for the price of surrender of the 
protection of the on the record rule. Nothing in those two Supreme Court 
cases, or any others, suggests such a modification of Overton Park. 
If the Court did want to make more information available to a reviewing 
court, presumably it would adjust Vermont Yankee and not the On the 
Record Rule. Relaxing the On the Record Rule to permit consideration of 
new matter on judicial review would make every agency proceeding a 
potential nullity from the beginning, even though an agency has considered 
all of the materials the APA requires it to consider and even though the 
agency has reasoned impeccably from those materials to its decision. Thus, 
from any realistic perspective, relaxing the On the Record Rule undoes 
Vermont Yankee by requiring an agency to do more than the APA requires 
if it wants to avoid having its decision overturned. Most plausibly, then, 
both the On the Record Rule and · U!rmont Yankee continue to coexist, 
defining a system of minimal record development, with review for 
rationality confined to that record. 
In short, judicial review of an agency's failure to consider a relevant 
factor not mentioned in the agency's explanation can occur if (1) there is 
a failure to consider adequately a matter required to be considered by the 
agency's statute, (2) a factor is well known and relevant enough to be 
judicially noticeable as requiring consideration, or (3) if the explanation or 
the record made by the appropriate agency procedures raises issues~ 
irrationally neglected by the agency.231 
Review for failure to consider factors is still meaningful even if it is 
confined .to a consideration of the agency's explanation and the record.232 
228. /d. at 547. 
229. 496 u.s. 633 (1990). 
230. /d. at 656. 
231.- /d. 
232. This is particularly true given the fact that ( l) in an informal rulemaking interested 
persons-almostanyone-can add to the record material seriously undercutting the agencies 
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The record may raise a factor not adequately analyzed by the agency in its 
explanation. This seems more likely in rulemaking where the APA 
guarantees a right to comment which, in effect, accords all interested 
persons a right to add to the administrative record material that undercuts 
an agency's decision. 
Inadequately treated relevant factors may appear in an agency's 
explanation of its decision, or in other parts of the record, submitted to a 
reviewing court by an agency, even though the factors are not extensively 
analyzed. An agency's failure to consider the factors raised by the record 
may be a justification for overturning the decision as arbitrary and 
capricious, on the grounds that the relevant factors were not explored 
adequately. 
A portion of the famous air bags case, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company,233 provides an 
example of an instance in which the Supreme Court overturned administra-
tive action based on an agency's arbitrary and capricious failure to consider 
adequately factors raised by the record that was before it at the time of the 
decision. 234 
In State Farm, the record itself revealed a factor that the Court thought 
any solid reasoner working under the statute would examine more carefully, 
although the agency made no attempt to do so.235 The Court noted that 
the agency had considered human "inertia" in rejecting passive seatbelts as 
not sufficiently cost effective,236 but did not consider that same factor 
when it concluded that automatic seatbelts were not cost effective to a 
sufficiently clear and great degree.237 
In an earlier, related proceeding, the agency concluded that lethargy or 
lack of concern might cause people to fail to make the effort to buckle 
passive seat belts, making them cost ineffective. In State Farm, the Court 
found the agency's rejection of automatic seat belts-based on the 
possibility that people would detach them-arbitrary and capricious.238 
and, in the absence of successful participation up front, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), (2) can 
successfully petition to have any grotesquely unsupported rule modified, see 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553( e) and cases cited supra note I 54, and (3) for fully informal adjudications, the Court 
views Congress as having determined that the stakes are so low that no one is entitled to 
notice of the issues before the agency or any right to present views. 
233. 463 u.s. 29 (1983). 
234. /d. at 46, 51-54. 
235. /d. at 56. 
236. /d. at 54. 
237. /d. 
238. 463 u.s. 29, 51-54 (1983). 
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The Court noted that, in this context, it would appear that inertia might well 
operate, but this time in favor of the effectiveness of the proposed 
device:239 Many people might not take the trouble to detach such belts. 
What was arbitrary and capricious was the agency's failure to explore this 
factor, already recognized by the agency, which seemed to work against its 
conclusion. 
It is worth noting that the Court did not allow the challenger to explore 
the inertia issue by augmenting the administrative record during judicial 
review. Rather, it held that the agency's decision could not stand until the 
agency satisfactorily explored such issues in a new proceeding.240 This, 
of course, is the Overton Park model. Instead of fixing a defective agency 
proceeding, the reviewing court struck it down, requiring the agency to act 
lawfully, or not at all. 
This indicates that relevant factor analysis has some real range of 
operation, even if it is confined to issues raised, in some way, by materials 
in the administrative record. There is a second way that relevant factor 
analysis might operate without seriously violating the On the Record Rule. 
Here, courts could go beyond the record, but only in the standard way they 
can in on-the-record judicial proceedings: by means of judicial notice.241 
There may be factors, not discussed in the record submitted to the court by 
an agency, whose relevance is so powerful and clear that a court may take 
judicial notice of them as factors not analyzed. The standard is very 
demanding. For a court to take judicial notice of a fact, it must find that 
fact "not subject to reasonable dispute."242 The "fact," in relevant factor 
analysis, would be of a second order, not the correctness of some 
proposition, but its nearly indisputable surface relevance--making it 
demand some sort of consideration from any rational decisionmaker. For 
this sort of relevant factor analysis to be reasonably limited, the "factor" 
would have to appear relevant to the court on the surface of things, not 
only after considering technical arguments. 
Where such an obviously huge gaffe has occurred, it may well be 
possible to avoid speaking of an exception to the On the Record Rule. 
Under such circumstances, it is more likely that the agency actually 
considered such a major and salient factor, but concluded that it was not 
worth more detailed consideration. Such consideration means that the factor 
239. /d. 
240. /d. at 56-57. 
241. For a good discussion of judicial notice, see CHRISTOPHER B. MILLER & LAIRD 
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 210 (1995). 
242. FED. R. EVID. 20l(b). 
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is on the record in the Overton Park sense, and its rejection should have 
been described in the materials submitted to the court. 
Indeed, there is a respectable case to be made that the agency's failure 
to consider adopting a rule mandating the use of airbags as a sole method 
of passive protection-a second failure found arbitrary and capricious in 
State Farm-involved this sort of judicial notice of the powerful surface 
case for airbags: a case so obvious that the court could take judicial ~otice 
of the powerful relevance of the unconsidered factor. 
A closer examination of State Farm, however, suggests a better 
explanation, and also suggests how rare such judicial notice may be, if it 
is allowed at all. In State Farm, the Court seems at pains to limit the 
opinion's significance by stressing that the powerful relevance of an airbag 
standard was raised by the cumulative record of the agency rulemaking and 
its precursors: 
Nor do we broadly require an agency to consider all policy alternatives in reaching 
decision. It is true that rulemaking "cannot be found wanting simply because the 
agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the 
mind of man ... regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative may 
have been .... " But the airbag is more than a policy alternative to the passive 
restraint standard; it is a technological alternative within the ambit of the existing 
standalrl. We hold only that given the judgment made in 1977 that airbags are an 
effective and cost-beneficiallife-saving technology, the mandatory passive restraint 
rule may not be abandoned without any consideration whatsoever of an 
airbags-only requirement. w 
The emphasized portions of the quotation are designed to stress that the 
Court is not straying beyond the record in finding a failure to consider 
relevant factors. 
The minimalist view of informal proceedings outlined above, matched 
with limitation of judicial scrutiny to the administrative record, often will 
be frustrating for a court required by Overton Park to engage in careful, 
probing review. There is a strong reason for such a limitation, at least 
based on the assumptions which currently undergird the Court's general 
philosophy of informal proceedings and judicial review. First, practical 
rationality (as opposed to rationality as a model or ideal) is always what is 
known as bounded rationality, or rationality acting on less information than 
would be available after an infinite inquiry or even an inquiry using all 
available resources. As Robert Nozick says: 
. . . rationality does not require the most extensive sifting of evidence, computa-
tional exertion, and so on. That process itself has its costs, and some (r:ough) 
243. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-51. 
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decision would be made about the amount of time and energy to be put into any 
particular decision or formation of belief.m 
241 
Rough seems the important word for present purposes. For any decision, 
someone must structure a finite and not an unlimited inquiry. The modern 
paradigm of administrative law leaves no doubt that agencies' decisions· 
about where to stop the inquiry are largely final.245 The bounded, if 
extensive and hard to define, administrative record is a metaphor for 
bounded rationality. Unless courts are 'to play the role of agencies, the 
latter must often act on hunches about what to consider, while the former 
must not disturb them except for fairly serious mistakes. 
One could require an agency to give a reason, R1, for no further study 
of a matter. For example, statistical material showing that drilling a test 
well in the terrain in question is likely to be unyielding. But must it also 
give a reason, R2, for believing R1 (an appraisal of the statistical material) 
and, if so, must it give an R3 as an explanation of R2, then R4 of R3? 
What is a reasonable place to allow the agency's unarticulated (and perhaps 
unarticulable) "feel" to break the chain of reasons? Can one give a reason 
for choosing that place? Even if so, does it make sense to require an 
explanation? 
The above analysis applies to relevant factors which could have been 
considered at the time of agency decision, but were not sufficiently 
considered. Suppose, however, that one wishes to attack an agency 
decision based entirely on material which became available after the 
agency's decision: for example, a scientific study completed after the 
agency's decision. On the actual record, the decision passes muster, but on 
the record as augmented by the report, it would not: The wages of the 
Overton Park appellate review-style model, re-endorsed strongly in Vermont 
Yankee, is that the decision stands. 
But what of truly egregious cases in which new material becomes 
available after the decision. Suppose such material proves that an agency 
decision is clearly erroneous. Is it conceivable that a court is limited to the 
record? Certainly it is. By analogy to pure judicial practice, a remedy· for 
244. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 125 (1993). 
245. This tendency makes itself apparent in many facets of the Jaw of administrative 
procedure. For example, agencies have very broad authority to bypass rulemaking 
procedures by announcing a new rule in an adjudication (SEC v. Chenery, Corp., 323 U.S. 
202-03 (1947)); their decisions not to bring enforcement proceedings are in most instances 
not judicially reviewable (Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)) and their decisions 
not to commence a rulemaking proceeding, if reviewable, are subject to extremely forgiving 
judicia] 'review· (American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 8J2 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)). 
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such rare cases is to ask for a rehearing of an adjudication, or the repeal or 
amendment of a rule. The agency's refusal is likely to be judicially 
reviewable in cases presenting the greatest injustices, or the strongest 
evidence of inequities.246 
2. Extra-Record "Technical" Factors 
In a number of cases, the lower federal courts have stated that a court, 
perplexed by the technical nature of an agency's decision, can develop 
extra-record evidence, but only as background to help it determine the 
adequacy of the original record.247 Often it is hard to determine from 
these courts' opinions exactly what is meant by this. In some cases, the 
technical information seems not to be new factual material, but simply 
further agency explanation of the materials it considered and how it used 
the materials to reason its result.248 As analyzed above, this is completely 
consistent with Overton Park and does not involve an excursion beyond the 
record within the meaning of the Court's On the Record Rule.249 
The language used by these courts, however, is often consistent with 
approval of excursions beyond the record to develop factual material that 
supports or undercuts an agency's explanation of its decision. In some 
cases, such excursions have actually been approved:250 
To a limited extent, therefore, the post-decision studies can be deemed a 
clarification or an explanation of the original information before the Agency, and 
for this purpose it is proper for us to consider them .... Hi! do not think it is 
appropriate, howeve1; for either party to use [such material] as a new rationaliza-
tion/or sustaining or attacking the agencies decision . .. it is inappropriate to rely 
on the specific conclusions of these studies to show that the [agency's action was] 
not the product of reasoned decision making.251 
246. American Horse, 812 F.2d at 4-5 (holding that agency decisions not to commence 
rulemaking are judicially reviewable unlike most decisions not to commence enforcement 
proceeding); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (indicating that 
intensity of judicial scrutiny in review for arbitrary and capricious agency action varies from 
context to context and that review of agency's decision not to undertake rulemaking is close 
to minimal end of spectrum of scrutiny). 
247. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
249. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text. 
250. Association ofPac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980). In this 
case, the extra-record information not allowed to supplement the record was also post-
decision information. !d. 
251. /d. 
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Is this position coherent? What does it, or could it, possibly mean for 
a court, in determining the self-sufficiency of a closed record to rationally 
support a decision, to be helped by extra-record materials? First, if such 
extra-record materials tum out to make a difference in a court's appraisal 
of a record's adequacy to support an agency's explanation of its decision, 
how can it be said that the decision stood or fell based on what was before 
the agency at the time of its decision? Second, if they can make no 
difference, they are legally irrelevant. Because there seems to be no third 
possibility, it appears that there is no justification for their admission in a 
proceeding for judicial review on the ground that they are just background 
which will somehow help facilitate a decision wholly based on other 
materials. 
Consider a case in which an agency rule is attacked based upon an 
argument that the agency decisionmakers misunderstood the meaning of 
technical words found in studies they relied upon, which significantly 
supported their rule or order. If the agency concedes its mistake, there 
should be no difficulty. The court must then assess its significance. If not, 
perhaps judicial notice will work if the error is glaring on the surface and 
the agency refuses to confess. 
If not, then, conventionally, what remains is a decision which is not 
obviously arbitrary or unreasonable given the factual record considered by 
the agency and the agency's interpretation of the statutory goals. One 
response, as some materials outside of administrative law suggest, might be 
to allow the reviewing judge to consider the new materials. If this 
approach is taken, it is important to note what has happened. Data not 
before the agency. has been added to the record with the potential of 
changing what was a supportable decision to an unsupportable decision or 
vice versa. 
There is only one plausible way to harmonize the On the Record Rule 
with the use of background information not appearing in the record that 
originally considered by the agency. This is to recognize that it is 
inevitable that courts, called on to make judgments of reasonableness or of 
rationality, bring to the task myriad bits of information which could not 
possibly be reflected on the record. Some of these bits of information 
define the techniques of rationality, and _some are information about the 
world to which those techniques apply. 
Just as sophisticated students of judicial and jury notice -recognize that 
the reasoning a judge or juror applies to the record in a conventional case 
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cannot and should not be a tabula rasa, this also applies to administrative 
review for insufficient rationality. 252 
A judge's web of beliefs about how the world works is part of the 
reasoning she brings to judicial review. This operates "inconspicuously and 
interstitially in the elementary process of judicial reasoning."253 Some 
examples are: 
... fire burns ... freeways can be crowded with fast moving cars ... deprivation 
of oxygen causes death ... gravity causes things to fall ... sexual intercourse 
causes pregnancy ... threats induce fear ... love or hate or jealousy can influence 
behavior ... . 25~ 
"Interstitially" and "inconspicuously" are good words to use to describe 
the process of judgment where the power of syllogisms runs out. To the 
extent that we simply have a rule of law which posits "if fact A then legal 
result X," and, if the court articulates that fact A has been established, then 
there is nothing interstitial and inconspicuous about the process of decision. 
But the existence of fact A, itself, may involve many hidden, smaller-scale 
judgments. For example, if fact A is that someone acted with a particular 
intent, there is no precise algorithm dealing with how to establish it. 
Myriad factors are relevant. A judge can make some of them ~;onspicuous 
by citing them in an opinion. But some of which the judge is aware will 
go unstated, and she may be unaware of others. There is a necessary gap 
between the articulated premises (which point toward, but do not syllogisti-
cally determine, the judge's conclusion) and the judgment that a person 
had, or did not have, a particular intent. 
The decision is shaped by the structure exposed in the opinion to the 
judgment, but the ·precise result is not determined exclusively by that 
structure. By analogy, imagine dropping a paper airplane from a high 
tower. The position of the tower-like the exposed syllogistic structure of 
the opinion-puts limits on where the airplane or the decision can go. But, 
in the gaps between structure and result, what determines the landing place 
is influenced by too many factors to be clear from inspection, or, perhaps 
ever to be articulable. It is a combination of thoughts too detailed and 
fragmentary to describe in an opinion, and, in some cases, present to the 
conscious mind of the judge only as an inclination to decide in one way or 
another. To make a judge articulate all conscious assumptions would make 
a legal opinion an expensive exercise in introspection resembling James 
252. MILLER & KIRKPA1RICK, supra note 232, § 210, at 102. 
253. Id § 210, at 104. 
254. Id at 103. 
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Joyce's Ulysses.- To make a judge unearth all unconscious influences 
would require something like a psychoanalysis for each leap of judgment. 
The more educated and informed they are about the world, the more 
successful judges are in leaping from the articulated structures to results. 
Judgments of rationality in judicial review of administrative action can 
never fully take the form of a syllogism. They combine a judge's peculiar 
sense of the techniques of rationality with many more facts about the world 
(evaluative facts) than can appear in an opinion. 
This analysis permits a better reading of the exception for technical 
background information. Such information is material that a judge can 
amass and allow to influence her in the gaps, but not as an explicit part of 
her opinion. By definition, this is a part of the mind of a judge that we 
could not, and would not want to, fully probe. A judge who is also a 
trained chemist may jump the gap from the articulated premises of her 
opinion to a conclusion as tp the reasonableness of an agency's conclu-
sion-a conclusion quite different from that of a colleague who is not so 
trained. Not only can we not put an end to this, but we would not want to. 
Beyond this we could not stop the untrained judge from intensively reading 
up on chemistry in order to make better guesses in the gaps. What neither 
the trained chemist judge nor her colleague could do is to use a proposition 
of chemistry as an articulated premise in her opinion, unless it was part of 
the record or indisputable and included as judicially noticed. 
Permitting a judge to enrich the understanding she will bring to the 
inevitable, unarticulated parts of conclusions, makes some sense of the 
technical background exception. Still, it seems somewhat problematic to 
allow the adversary process to be used for gathering inform~tion which, by 
hypothesis, does not bear directly on the issues which have and will have 
crystallized in articulate form for explicit resolution. Such issues define 
relevancy and, thus, normally serve to limit the scope of factfinding at trial. 
Such an exception makes one wonder what the limits are on a trial as a 
process of judicial education undefined by specific articulated limits. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has offered a view of the Supreme Court's current 
minimalist vision of (1) the agency procedures required for informal action, 
(2) the real, but still comparatiyely slight, level of judicial review 
appropriate for such informal proceedings, and particularly (3) the status 
and place of the On the Record Rule in such a system. Although it has 
been claimed that the On the Record Rule has been riddled with exceptions 
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created by lower court cases, only two generaF55 exceptions seem to have 
a real following among those courts. The exception allowing a reviewing 
court to consider extra-record evidence in order to determine that an agency 
has appropriately considered relevant factors is an aberration and is rarely 
used, though more often recited. The Supreme Court's vision of adminis-
trative law, at least since Overton Park, has been incompatible with such 
an exception. More legitimate, if properly limited, is the exception 
permitting consideration of extra-record materials to provide a reviewing 
court with the background necessary to assess a highly technical record of 
agency proceedings. Such extra-record inquiries seem almost inevitable, 
given the problems of generalist courts attempting to assess the rationality 
of a great many agency decisions on various technical subjects. The use 
of such material must, however, be extremely limited. It cannot appear in 
a reviewing court's opinion as part of the explicit reasoning. Rather, once 
admitted, it may simply be used only to give a court a feel for the issues. 
Why is it so clear that the Supreme Court's view of judicial review of 
agency action does not permit a court to augment an agency's record with 
new factual information used explicitly to evaluate the rationality of the 
agency's decision? In understanding what the Supreme Court currently 
requires, it seems implausible that Vermont Yankee would exempt agencies 
from more stringent requirements for development of relevant factual 
material/56 only to permit reviewing courts, de novo, to develop the 
material that an agency missed by using less formal procedures. This 
implausible view would see Vermont Yankee as implicitly repealing Overton 
Park's On the Record Rule in significant ways. The notion would be that, 
if a court cannot force an agency to use intensive procedures in making its 
decision, the court can make up for the loss of information in the agency's 
record by developing the lost information de novo in the review proceeding. 
There are two reasons why this seems plainly wrong as a description of 
the current system. First, neither in Vermont Yankee nor in any other case 
has the Court indicated that it is abandoning or even loosening the On the 
Record Rule. Second, if the Court did want to make more information 
available to a reviewing court, presumably it would adjust Vermont Yankee 
255. I exclude the exception for the National Environmental Policy Act cases because 
it seems understood to be the product of requirements in a specific regulatory act and not 
a general amendment to the Overton Park vision of review. See supra note 194 and 
accompanying text. 
256. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 524 ( 1978) (prohibiting courts from requiring agencies to use more procedure 
than required by APA absent compelling circumstances). 
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and no the On the Record Rule. Relaxing the On the Record Rule to 
permit consideration of new matter on judicial review would make every 
agency proceeding a potential nullity from the beginning, even though an 
agency has considered all of the materials the APA requires it to consider 
and even though the agency has reasoned impeccably from those materials 
to its decision. Thus, from any realistic perspective, relaxing the On the 
Record Rule undoes Vermont Yankee by requiring an agency to do more 
than the APA requires if it wants to avoid having its decision overturned. 
Most plausibly, then, both the On the Record Rule and Vermont Yankee 
continue to coexist, defining a system of minimal record development, with 
review for rationality confined to that record. 
To describe the current "Supreme Court's vision of informal proceedings 
is, of course, not to agree with it. Compelling reasons of legitimacy require 
that some responsible Congress legislate to allign various agency actions on 
various subjects with appropriate procedures.257 Far too attenuated is any 
connection between the original "meaning" of the half-century-old APA and 
the current regulatory world, which may not be adequately dealt with by 
the APA's original procedural categories. This is particularly true because 
the appropriate design of administrative procedure is largely a question for 
the political process.258 The issue is the optimum balance of agency 
freedom versus external controls in a wide variety of proceedings involving 
differing regulatory subjects and differing public and private interests.259 
'Florida East Coast Railway makes nearly all rulemaking proceedings 
informal under the APA, regardless of their subjects or the issues 
involved.260 Vermont Yankee generally forbids a court's requiring more 
procedure than does the APA?61 While there are plausible arguments that 
all rulemaking should be subject to minimalist procedures of no greater 
intensity than that required by the Florida East Coast-~rmont Yankee 
regime, the diversity of rulemaking activity warrants at least some 
skepticism that the choice must be between fully formal proceedings under 
APA sections 556 and 557 and informal proceedings as currently constitut-
257. Unfortunately, I doubt whether the current Congress is capable of mature, 
deliberative politics on any large scale. 
258. See Anton in Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The AP A, the D. C. Circuit and the Supreme 
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 405-09. 
259. /d. 
260. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 235-38 (1973). It also, 
strangely, affects the interpretation of individual agency enabling acts so that, unless they 
are explicit, they are likely to be read as requiring no more procedure than does the APA. 
/d. at 236-42. 
261. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524. 
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ed under section 553. Perhaps some should be fully formal, some slightly 
less so, some still less so but as rigorous as section 553 now requires, and 
some largely or entirely exempt even from the rigors of section 553 as now 
construed. 262 
Adjudications pose similar problems, although they are somewhat 
amelioratied because due process will sometimes mandate procedures more 
deftly attuned to the conflicting public and private interests. Although the 
Supreme Court has not spoken as to informal adjudications, the D.C. 
Circuit's approach, if it ultimately becomes the national one, renders most 
such proceedings informal at an agency's option.263 As to the procedures 
required under the APA in such an informal agency adjudication, there are 
almost none. The Supreme Court has spoken in Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corp.: there is no right to submit arguments or evidence or even to have 
notice of the issues. 264 In review of informal adjudications, as well, 
Vermont Yankee stops a court from requiring more of an agency, regardless 
of what is at stake, short of due process protected interests. 
The regime of Florida East Coast Railway and Vermont Yankee in 
applying the 1946 APA to the current world resembles an attempt to stretch 
a child's old clothes to fit her as an adult. Even with the best effort, new 
clothes would be preferable. The issues surveyed here--what procedures 
an agency must follow; what is the appropriate intensity of judicial review; 
and what materials should a court consult in determining the adequacy of 
an agency's inquiry and reasoning-would seem to have different answers 
for different proceedings, answers not always to be found in the original 
four procedural packages of the APA. For example as to agency proceed-
ings, Justice (then Professor) Scalia proposed an APA 'that would offer 
many more discrete packages of procedures than the APA currently 
provides: 
... I would settle for an APA that contains not merely three but ten or fifteen 
basic procedural formats-an inventory large enough to provide the basis for a 
whole spectrum of legislative compromises without the necessity for shopping 
elsewhere. 265 
262. For an earlier similar view, see Scalia, supra note 258 and infra note 265 and 
accompanying text. 
263. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, &73 F.2d 1477, 1479-83 (19&9) 
(according Chevron deference to agency's reading of phrases in its enabling act that 
determine whether it triggers APA's formal set of procedures or its informal set). 
264. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990). 
265. Scalia, supra note 258, at 408. The reference to three sorts of procedures may seem 
confusing in light of the existence of four sorts of procedures under the APA: informal 
adjudication and rulemaking and formal adjudication and rulemaking. However, the APA 
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This problem of an ill-fitting APA created the pressures that courts felt 
before vermont Yankee to intensify agency procedure, not only to improve 
agency functioning, but also to facilitate meaningful judicial review.266 
Since these pressures have been pushed back by vermont Yankee, 
occasionally they have bulged out in a different form in lower court 
opinions that create exceptions to the On the Record Rule. This pressure 
is worth acknowledging and, indeed, taking very seriously. It must be 
difficult for a well-educated, public-spirited federal judge to put her stamp 
of approval (or disapproval) on agency decisions of important public policy, 
while feeling terribly uncertain of exactly what she is doing. In a moment 
of excess, one might even ask if this is an appropriate, task for Article III 
judges. More realistically and much less dramatically, it seems fair to 
observe that, if federal judges are to be forced to do such precarious guess 
work, it would help for a reasonably contemporaneous Congress to tell 
them with more precision how much guess work is required in a variety of 
regulatory contexts. 
nowhere defines a set of procedures for informal rulemaking. 5 U.S. C.§ 554 (1994). See 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 496 U.S. at 655-56 (stating that in informal adjudications, 
there is no right to submit arguments or evidence or even to have notice of issues). 
266. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 u.s. 519, 541-42 (1978). 
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